The Eagle versus the Dragon
Ian Bremmer has rightly observed that the United States and China are growing dangerously
hostile towards one another. He posed the question whether this could be worse than the
Cold War (Bremmer 2010). The fact that the “list of irritants” in Sino-U.S. relations has grown
in recent years seems to validate Bremmer’s point. For example, back in 2010, burgeoning
bilateral tensions almost led to a trade and currency war. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner claimed that China’s refusal to rapidly increase the value of its currency was hurting
America’s economic recovery. Rejecting the claim, Chinese leaders stressed that the
United States was wrong to blame China for its economic woes (Yong 2010). On top of this,
the United States accused China of failing to protect the intellectual property of foreign
companies. But economic issues were not the only flashpoints in Sino-U.S. relations. The
two countries disagreed over sanctions against Iran in regards to its nuclear program. The
United States kept a watchful eye on political developments in North Korea—a country
which has enjoyed a special relationship with China. Meanwhile, China criticized the United
States for interfering in the Sino-Japanese conflict concerning the dispute over the ownership
of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands—the issue that stole the limelight during the 17th
ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in late October 2010. In the Southeast Asian context, the United
1
Pavin Chachavalpongpun — Thailand in Sino-U.S. Rivalry
States was uneasy about the closeness between the Chinese leaders and their counterparts
in Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. Besides which, the resurgence of the territorial disputes in
the South China Sea, which involve China, Taiwan and four members of ASEAN—Vietnam,
Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines—has threatened peace and security in the region. The
United States perceived the ongoing conflict as a threat to its own interest, namely, the
right to freely navigate the disputed area. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called
the conflict “a leading diplomatic priority” for the United States during the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) meeting in Vietnam in July 2010 (Ten Kate & Gaouette 2010). In 2012, China
proved that its influence in Cambodia was well established when Beijing was able to convince
Phnom Penh not to permit the issuance of the Joint Communiqué which contained
references to the South China Sea not entirely favorable to China. This was the first time in
ASEAN’s history that a joint communiqué was not released in the closing stages of a conference.
But these problems are merely symptoms of troubled Sino-U.S. relations. The real cause of
the problems lies in the power struggle between the two powers, one of which seeks to
maintain its status as the world’s sole superpower while the other has emerged as a new
challenger to the current international order. This essay concurs with the widespread belief
that China’s economic and military rise will inevitably shift the regional order that the
United States has helped to sustain since the end of the Cold War. John Mearsheimer argued
in 2005 that “A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out
of the Asia-Pacific region, in much the same way as the United States pushed the European great powers
out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century” (Mearsheimer 2005). Southeast Asia
has evidently become a battlefield in the fiercely competitive power game between the
United States and China, as both have tried, through different methods and strategies, to
retain their domination over countries in the region (Bert 2003: 83). There is a possibility
that China may use its newly gained capabilities to defy the American claim to leadership,
particularly in Southeast Asia, and to reestablish regional hegemony of its own. Indeed,
China has already extended its influence on neighboring states that were previously dominated
by U.S. interests, including Thailand (Vogelmann 2008: 2; Khalilzad et al 1999: 70).
The Eagle versus the DragonIan Bremmer has rightly observed that the United States and China are growing dangerouslyhostile towards one another. He posed the question whether this could be worse than theCold War (Bremmer 2010). The fact that the “list of irritants” in Sino-U.S. relations has grownin recent years seems to validate Bremmer’s point. For example, back in 2010, burgeoningbilateral tensions almost led to a trade and currency war. U.S. Treasury Secretary TimothyGeithner claimed that China’s refusal to rapidly increase the value of its currency was hurtingAmerica’s economic recovery. Rejecting the claim, Chinese leaders stressed that theUnited States was wrong to blame China for its economic woes (Yong 2010). On top of this,the United States accused China of failing to protect the intellectual property of foreigncompanies. But economic issues were not the only flashpoints in Sino-U.S. relations. Thetwo countries disagreed over sanctions against Iran in regards to its nuclear program. TheUnited States kept a watchful eye on political developments in North Korea—a countrywhich has enjoyed a special relationship with China. Meanwhile, China criticized the UnitedStates for interfering in the Sino-Japanese conflict concerning the dispute over the ownershipof the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands—the issue that stole the limelight during the 17thASEAN Summit in Hanoi in late October 2010. In the Southeast Asian context, the United1Pavin Chachavalpongpun — Thailand in Sino-U.S. RivalryStates was uneasy about the closeness between the Chinese leaders and their counterpartsin Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. Besides which, the resurgence of the territorial disputes inthe South China Sea, which involve China, Taiwan and four members of ASEAN—Vietnam,Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines—has threatened peace and security in the region. TheUnited States perceived the ongoing conflict as a threat to its own interest, namely, theright to freely navigate the disputed area. Then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calledthe conflict “a leading diplomatic priority” for the United States during the ASEAN RegionalForum (ARF) meeting in Vietnam in July 2010 (Ten Kate & Gaouette 2010). In 2012, Chinaproved that its influence in Cambodia was well established when Beijing was able to convincePhnom Penh not to permit the issuance of the Joint Communiqué which containedreferences to the South China Sea not entirely favorable to China. This was the first time inASEAN’s history that a joint communiqué was not released in the closing stages of a conference.But these problems are merely symptoms of troubled Sino-U.S. relations. The real cause ofthe problems lies in the power struggle between the two powers, one of which seeks tomaintain its status as the world’s sole superpower while the other has emerged as a newchallenger to the current international order. This essay concurs with the widespread beliefthat China’s economic and military rise will inevitably shift the regional order that theUnited States has helped to sustain since the end of the Cold War. John Mearsheimer arguedin 2005 that “A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States outof the Asia-Pacific region, in much the same way as the United States pushed the European great powersout of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century” (Mearsheimer 2005). Southeast Asiahas evidently become a battlefield in the fiercely competitive power game between theUnited States and China, as both have tried, through different methods and strategies, toretain their domination over countries in the region (Bert 2003: 83). There is a possibilitythat China may use its newly gained capabilities to defy the American claim to leadership,particularly in Southeast Asia, and to reestablish regional hegemony of its own. Indeed,China has already extended its influence on neighboring states that were previously dominatedby U.S. interests, including Thailand (Vogelmann 2008: 2; Khalilzad et al 1999: 70).
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..