Any set of minimal conditions for determining a right administrative act should include the availability of categories necessary for some kind of dis-course about the rightness (including the justness) of that act. Candidate categories include reliable knowledge; others may include agency. Recall that deconstruction appears to obliterate such categories. The possibility of deconstruction being counted as capable of yielding a right administrative act may be seen as revolving around what Derrida calls "undecidability" or, in de Man's term, "unreadability." The character of deconstruction seems to hold little promise for reliable knowledge and reliable judgments. Does it make sense to say that it is right (or just) to determine that for any text (where text is understood to include not only writings but also events and lives) there is no decidable meaning? Recall that Derrida (1976) writes that deconstruction is a "strategy without finality" (p. 24). As Rorty (1982) characterizes it, "For Derrida, writing always leads to more writing, and more, and still more" (p. 94).