Harrison identifies a second explanation as rooted in resolution of an internal debate that began at the start of Bush’s presidency over “whether to give the North Koreans an ultimatum or to negotiate. . .” Bush agreed with hardliners that “North Korea is a failing Stalinist dictatorship held together only by the ruthless repression of a mad ruler who dreams of firing nuclear weapons at Los Angeles.” During August 2002, the president finally decided at his Texas Ranch that it was time to overthrow the regime, waving his finger in the air and shouting “I loathe Kim Jong Il!” He elaborated self-righteously how he had “a visceral reaction to this guy, because he is starving his people.” Canceling plans to follow the “Bold Approach” at the next meeting, Bush’s strategy was to use claims of the HEU program to unite world opinion against Pyongyang, justifying the imposition of economic sanctions that would hasten the fall of the DPRK. Harrison contended at the time that Bush was acting on his belief in the U.S. right to impose democracy and capitalism on other nations because these were the only proper and legitimate systems in the world.64 Less extreme, Crowell speculated that Bush falsely characterized Pyongyang’s enrichment of uranium as a weapons program to mask his real aim of preventing the DPRK from avoiding dependence on the United States for fuel to operate its LWRs. The administration could not admit its true intention without agreeing with Pyongyang that it purposely had misrepresented Kang’s comments to Kelly.65