There is, however, an important difference between critical theory and
the Greeks which relates to the conditions under which knowledge
claims can be made regarding social and political life. There are two
points worth recalling in this regard: firstly, the Kantian point that
reflection on the limits of what we can know is a fundamental part of
138 Critical Theory
theorizing and, secondly, a Hegelian and Marxian point that knowledge
is always, and irreducibly, conditioned by historical and material
contexts; in Mark Rupert’s words (2003: 186), it is always ‘situated
knowledge’. Since critical theory takes society itself as its object of
analysis, and since theories and acts of theorizing are never independent
of society, critical theory’s scope of analysis must necessarily include
reflection on theory. In short, critical theory must be self-reflective; it
must include an account of its own genesis and application in society. By
drawing attention to the relationship between knowledge and society,
which is so frequently excluded from mainstream theoretical analysis,
critical theory recognizes the political nature of knowledge claims.