ALTERNATIVES
There is a tendency in rolitical philosophy to thiab E of the state in opposition to the state of nature or to anarchy. is important not to think of these concepts as exhausting the possible forms of political organization. Hobbes, of course, understood these alternatives to be exhaustive: either asocial anarcby or a sovereign state. It is imporant, especially at this time, to consider more carefully the variety of forms of political organization that may be available The tendency of many philosophers and of some social scientists, in particular anthropologists, to of expansively to include all forms of political organization is an earor, one which hides the diversity of ways of arranging our lives, The state, as the fundamental form of political organization, has swept the world. Today virtually all of the land masses of the globe are territorial states. The state system, once European, now includes China and Japan, as well as the former colonies the modern empires. But the global spread of the state system does not convey the full extent of the state's victory over alternative forms of political 5 organization. The state has conquered our imagina tions as well. is not just that we tend to dismiss anarchism. It is that we do not easily imagine many alternatives to states. We have trouble, for instance, understanding the status of various 'international bodies and cften insinctively categoriz: insti aiaaal attempts regulate states as themselves proto-states, for instance, the United Nations was once thought of as a step towards "World Government' (more threat ening and now European Union is feared as a potential federal state, a States of as well our understanding of the remnants of pre-statist European polities, such as (a grand duchy), Liechtenstein and Monaco (principalities), San Marino (a republic), or Andorra (under the joint suzerainty of the President e and the Bishop of Urgel, Spain). We commonly take these to be states. It is not thought an absurdity to consider the Vatican a state, though it has no citizenry (see Shaw,) it is as if our mind, as well as the categories of law, had room only for one sort of entity or unit.
Normatively, the state's victury is equally com- is common in political philosophy to e that our societies are and must be states, the questions revolving over what shape they d take, what policies govermments should what ideals they should serve, if any, the like. referred in my opening remarks to the n tendency to take the state to be the subject al modem political philosophy. cooider the case of Rawls, who understands primary subject of justice [to be] the basic nature of society, or more exactly, the way in h the major social institutions distribute funda- tal rights and duties and determine the division advantages from social cooperation'. These norinstitutions are "the political constitution and economic and social ariangements 57l: 7. In Polinical Liberaism Rawls specifies basic structure as "a society's main political, cial, and economic institutions, and how they fit kredar into one unified system of social co-operation mone generation to the next' (996: I!). And He odcates that be takes the basic structure to be "a badem constitutional democracy'. It is certainly ssible to think of non-statist political, social, and economic institutions that might be thought to be a nic structure, but it is not clear thai they would coetsarily constitute a single, unitary system. svis seems simply to assume that modern states the setting for his account of justice." We considered earlier how modern states. erred from the political orders of late medieval ope. The world replaced by the modem em had many alternative arrangements. Charles y reminds of the possibilities offered by these lamatives when he argues that the victory of the modern state was not inevitable:
in the thirt century, then, five outcomes may still have been open: (1) the form of national state which actually emerged: (2) a political federation or empire controlled, if only loosely, from a single centre; (3) a theocratic federation a commonwealth held together the structure of the Catholic Church; (4) an intensive bading network without large-scale, central political organization; (5) the persistence of the feudal' structure which prevailed in the thirteenth century. (1975: 25-6)
Tilly notes that the Roman Empire was followed by the Holy Roman Empire and reminds us not to for- get about the Habsburgs' Empire or federation. The city-republics of northern Italy and the cities of northern Europe were also, for some time, viable alternatives to states. Even if the various political orders of late medieval Europe are not viable models for our world, certain features of these older forms of polit- ical organization represent alternatives. Hedley Bull speculates that it is "conceivable that sovereign states might disappear and be replaced not by world government but by a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political organization that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages' (1997: 254). It is hard to say, however, what forms a viable alternative to the state system may take. Presumably the growth and development of international law will figure prominently in a new world order. But it is too soon to tell what alter- ations the state system may undergo. In the last decade of the twentieth century there was consider- able enthusiasm about globalization and a new world order, ore which limited the sovereign pow ers of states. But the security fears caused by inter- national terrorism at the start of the new century may serve only to reinforce the old state system. It may be too early for Minerva's owl to take flight.
ทางเลือก There is a tendency in rolitical philosophy to thiab E of the state in opposition to the state of nature or to anarchy. is important not to think of these concepts as exhausting the possible forms of political organization. Hobbes, of course, understood these alternatives to be exhaustive: either asocial anarcby or a sovereign state. It is imporant, especially at this time, to consider more carefully the variety of forms of political organization that may be available The tendency of many philosophers and of some social scientists, in particular anthropologists, to of expansively to include all forms of political organization is an earor, one which hides the diversity of ways of arranging our lives, The state, as the fundamental form of political organization, has swept the world. Today virtually all of the land masses of the globe are territorial states. The state system, once European, now includes China and Japan, as well as the former colonies the modern empires. But the global spread of the state system does not convey the full extent of the state's victory over alternative forms of political 5 organization. The state has conquered our imagina tions as well. is not just that we tend to dismiss anarchism. It is that we do not easily imagine many alternatives to states. We have trouble, for instance, understanding the status of various 'international bodies and cften insinctively categoriz: insti aiaaal attempts regulate states as themselves proto-states, for instance, the United Nations was once thought of as a step towards "World Government' (more threat ening and now European Union is feared as a potential federal state, a States of as well our understanding of the remnants of pre-statist European polities, such as (a grand duchy), Liechtenstein and Monaco (principalities), San Marino (a republic), or Andorra (under the joint suzerainty of the President e and the Bishop of Urgel, Spain). We commonly take these to be states. It is not thought an absurdity to consider the Vatican a state, though it has no citizenry (see Shaw,) it is as if our mind, as well as the categories of law, had room only for one sort of entity or unit. Normatively, the state's victury is equally com- is common in political philosophy to e that our societies are and must be states, the questions revolving over what shape they d take, what policies govermments should what ideals they should serve, if any, the like. referred in my opening remarks to the n tendency to take the state to be the subject al modem political philosophy. cooider the case of Rawls, who understands primary subject of justice [to be] the basic nature of society, or more exactly, the way in h the major social institutions distribute funda- tal rights and duties and determine the division advantages from social cooperation'. These norinstitutions are "the political constitution and economic and social ariangements 57l: 7. In Polinical Liberaism Rawls specifies basic structure as "a society's main political, cial, and economic institutions, and how they fit kredar into one unified system of social co-operation mone generation to the next' (996: I!). And He odcates that be takes the basic structure to be "a badem constitutional democracy'. It is certainly ssible to think of non-statist political, social, and economic institutions that might be thought to be a nic structure, but it is not clear thai they would coetsarily constitute a single, unitary system. svis seems simply to assume that modern states the setting for his account of justice." We considered earlier how modern states. erred from the political orders of late medieval ope. The world replaced by the modem em had many alternative arrangements. Charles y reminds of the possibilities offered by these lamatives when he argues that the victory of the modern state was not inevitable:ในศตวรรษ thirt แล้ว ผลห้าอาจยังคงได้รับการเปิด: (1) รูปแบบของรัฐแห่งชาติซึ่งที่จริง เกิด: (2) เป็นสหพันธ์การเมืองหรือควบคุม ถ้าเพียงจักรวรรดิซึ่ง จากศูนย์เดียว (3) เป็นสหพันธ์ theocratic เครือจักรภพที่จัดกันโครงสร้างของโบสถ์คาทอลิก (4) เครือข่ายไม่ มีขนาดใหญ่ กลางทางการเมืององค์กร bading แบบเร่งรัดการ (5) การมีอยู่ของศักดินาที่ ' โครงสร้างซึ่งแผ่ขยายไปในศตวรรษสิบสาม (1975:25-6)Tilly notes that the Roman Empire was followed by the Holy Roman Empire and reminds us not to for- get about the Habsburgs' Empire or federation. The city-republics of northern Italy and the cities of northern Europe were also, for some time, viable alternatives to states. Even if the various political orders of late medieval Europe are not viable models for our world, certain features of these older forms of polit- ical organization represent alternatives. Hedley Bull speculates that it is "conceivable that sovereign states might disappear and be replaced not by world government but by a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political organization that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages' (1997: 254). It is hard to say, however, what forms a viable alternative to the state system may take. Presumably the growth and development of international law will figure prominently in a new world order. But it is too soon to tell what alter- ations the state system may undergo. In the last decade of the twentieth century there was consider- able enthusiasm about globalization and a new world order, ore which limited the sovereign pow ers of states. But the security fears caused by inter- national terrorism at the start of the new century may serve only to reinforce the old state system. It may be too early for Minerva's owl to take flight.
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