Pay-for-individual-performance system, despite their motivating power, would not, then, be expected to result in enhanced organizational effectiveness. Such systems build in disincentives for the management of uncertainty, interdependence, and complexity and so discourage the kind of cooperative actions that lead the organizational from to be more efficient than labor contracting. If the organization dose, in fact, have individual tasks that are predictable, simple, and independence, this analysis suggests that it would be more efficient to hire contractors than employees. Pay for individual performance is neither a labor contract ( since the authority relationship remains ) nor a conventional employment relationship ( with rewards allocated based on post hoc judgments of overall employee historical and potential contributions ). Thus organizations that use such from of compensation would be expected to have less effective performance than those not using such system, since their compensation system is working against the advantages of the organizational from. We certainly could not expect the greater overall organizational effectiveness implied by pay-for-performance advocates.