I take welfare to be a kind of intrinsic but relational value. It is natural to
distinguish things that are intrinsically good for a person from things that are
extrinsically good for a person. Intuitively, all sorts of things can be at least
extrinsically good for a person (e.g., money, health, sunshine, an education, ice-cream).
But if they are merely extrinsically good, then their goodness is derivative and
contingent. The concept of welfare, by contrast, is the concept of something that is
good in itself and underivatively for a subject. But, as the expression ‘for a subject’
suggests, this is nevertheless a relational kind of value. One and the same thing (such
as, perhaps, Hillary’s being happy at noon) can be intrinsically good for one subject (in
this example, Hillary) and be totally worthless for another subject (e.g., someone who
died long before Hillary was born).