The separation of ownership and control between shareholders and managers in public corporation can play an important role in determining the level of pay to a firm's manager ([40] Liu and Muar, 2011). A higher ownership concentration has important implications for the entrenched managers' remuneration. The structure of managerial remuneration is of critical importance to align managerial interests' with shareholders' interests. According to [55] Tian and Twite (2011), executive compensation in Australia is not tied to stock performance like in the developed countries such as the USA and the UK. We argue that, in favour of shareholders' wealth maximization, an increase in the proportion of share options in the managerial compensation contract would be useful. Furthermore, employees can also control managerial opportunism if they are represented on the firm's board of directors. In this way, the private benefits of control could be identified and reduced. Recent studies have shown that managerial entrenchment affect workers' pay and that corporate governance can be of importance for labour market outcomes such as worker's pay ([12] Cronqvist et al. , 2009). Future research should examine the link between managerial entrenchment and worker's pay.