I said at the beginning of this chapter that accepting the mind-brain identity theory has major implications for questions about reality and knowledge, and I have tried to show how neural processes such as perception and inference enable brains to have knowledge of reality. Implication, like inference, is not a simple relation, as it requires looking at the most fully coherent system of hypotheses, assessed through the dynamic interaction of representations operating in parallel. Hence my argument is not some simple deduction: minds are brains, so constructive realism is true. Rather, like all inferences, my conclusions are justified by overall coherence: given that minds are brains, and given everything else we know, the most coherent conclusion is that people use perception and inference to the best explanation to construct knowledge about reality. This process of justification will seem circular if you think that knowledge should have a foundation of indubitable truths from which other truths are derived. But no one has ever succeeded in identifying such a foundation in either sense experience or a priori reasoning, so we have to strive instead to construct the most coherent systems of representations that we can.