Variations in audit frequency among firms is an optimal response to variations in the levels of agency costs. There is a well-established link between the level of agency cost in a firm and demand for assurance. This link arises because higher agency costs imply greater risk of loss of shareholder wealth and therefore greater demand for assurance. A substantial body of literature indicates that variations in demand for assurance can be operationalized through differentiating the quality of the audit (see, for example, Craswell, Francis, and Taylor [1995]; Defond [1992]; Francis and Wilson [1988]; Simunic and Stein [1987]; Palmrose [1984]). In a similar vein, Anderson, Francis, and Stokes (1993) argue for variations in the scope of the audit engagement in response to variations in agency costs. In this paper, we suggest optimally varying the frequency of the audit in response to differences in agency costs among firms.
Variations in audit frequency among firms is an optimal response to variations in the levels of agency costs. There is a well-established link between the level of agency cost in a firm and demand for assurance. This link arises because higher agency costs imply greater risk of loss of shareholder wealth and therefore greater demand for assurance. A substantial body of literature indicates that variations in demand for assurance can be operationalized through differentiating the quality of the audit (see, for example, Craswell, Francis, and Taylor [1995]; Defond [1992]; Francis and Wilson [1988]; Simunic and Stein [1987]; Palmrose [1984]). In a similar vein, Anderson, Francis, and Stokes (1993) argue for variations in the scope of the audit engagement in response to variations in agency costs. In this paper, we suggest optimally varying the frequency of the audit in response to differences in agency costs among firms.
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