which is an important component of the overall opportunity cost to operate underground. To the extent that financial development reduces the cost of credit, it increases the opportunity cost of informality. Some papers explore such relation. Straub (2005) develops a model in which firms choose between formality and informality. Being formal involves higher entry costs but lower penalties for defaulting and lower financial costs since hidden incomes cannot be used as collateral. In Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) entrepreneurs choose between a formal and an informal sector by trading off higher entry costs and tax obligations in the formal sector against higher financial costs in the informal sector. Pant et al. (2009) explore the relationship between employment, informal activities and financial intermediation. The idea is that formal employment can spur financial intermediation since workers with regular jobs tend to use more intensively the banking system as depositors. In Blackburn et al. (2012) entrepreneurs need external resources for investment and can reduce the level of information costs and the financial outlays by supplying more collateral. Supplying more collateral, however, involves a higher tax burden. Given the financial costs, entrepreneurs choose whether or not to evade taxes and to operate underground. Ellul et al. (2012) suggest that when firms choose accounting transparency, they trade off the benefits of access to more abundant and cheaper capital against the cost of a higher tax burden, and study this trade-off in a model with distortionary taxes and endogenous rationing of external finance