The critics of neutrality, on the other hand, assert that pluralism
should be envisaged as an axiological principle, expressing the
recognition that there are many different and incompatible ways of life
that are nevertheless valuable. This is the meaning of the Value
pluralism' defended by Joseph Raz, who establishes a connection
between pluralism and the ideal of personal autonomy. According to
Raz, autonomy presupposes moral pluralism because it is only if a
person has a variety of morally acceptable options to choose from that
shecan live an autonomous life. He states: To put it more precisely, if
autonomy is an ideal then we are committed to such a view of morality:
valuing autonomy leads to the endorsement of moral pluralism.'
9
Contrary to Rawls, who believes that pluralism requires the rejection
of perfectionism, Raz sees a necessary link between the kind of
perfectionism to which he is committed and the existence of pluralism.
This allows him to conceive pluralism not merely as a 'fact* that we
have grudgingly to accept, but as something to be celebrated and
valued because it is the condition for personal autonomy. We can see
why, from such a perspective, one more akin to John Stuart Mill than to
Locke, the fostering of pluralism cannot be theorized in terms of
neutrality.