There has been increasing acceptance in recent years of capital controls on inflows as a
prudential measure aimed at preventing a build-up of short-term foreign liabilities, particularly in 2
lower-income countries that do not have the capacity to put in place sophisticated financial
supervisory regimes. In the words of Michael Mussa (2000), “[h]igh openness to international
capital flows, especially short-term credit flows, can be dangerous for countries with weak or
inconsistent macro-economic policies or inadequately capitalized and regulated financial
systems.”1
But the use of capital controls on outflows as a crisis-resolution measure remains
highly controversial, despite a clear-cut economic rationale. As emphasized in “secondgeneration”
models of currency crises, a country can be faced with creditor panic and a run on
reserves even when it has strong fundamentals. In these situations, a temporary suspension of
capital-account convertibility can stop the rush to the exits and provide time for policy makers to
take corrective action—it can “rule out the bad equilibrium by force majeure,” in Paul Krugman’s
(1999a) words. But the risk is that capital controls can prove ineffective, undercut market
confidence even further, and be used to delay needed adjustments.