This study finds that ERCs are higher for firms with abnormally high audit fees. This
conclusion holds for different proxies for unexpected earnings, different samples, and alternative
definitions of unexpected returns. There is some evidence that abnormally high
nonaudit fees are associated with lower ERCs; however, that finding is sensitive to the
unexpected earnings proxy and the definition of unexpected returns. The results suggest
that the market rewards firms with unexpectedly high audit fees and only weakly suggest
that the market interprets abnormally profitable nonaudit engagements as a threat to
auditor independence. One possible conclusion is that investors interpret unexpectedly high
audit fees as an indication that a firm is engaging in (costly) signaling of high earnings
quality by acquiring more audit services than expected. It seems unlikely that the market
interprets the high fees as an indication of unanticipated risk factors or extraordinarily
profitable engagements since both would lead to an expectation of lower rather than higher
earnings quality. The study provides some support for continued disclosure of fees for the
purposes of informing markets about earnings quality and adds to the growing literature
that examines the relation between fees and both earnings quality and auditor independence.