The idea that confirming feedback would lead to confidence inflation is not surprising. What is surprising, however, is that confirming feedback that is given after the identification leads eyewitnesses to misremember how confident they were at the time of the identification (Wells & Bradfield, 1998). Because the feedback manipulation occurs after the identification has already been made, random assignment to conditions assures that the confirming feedback and no feedback (control) eyewitnesses are in fact equally confident at the time of the identification. Hence, confirming feedback does not merely inflate how confident the witness feels after the feedback; it distorts eyewitnesses’ recollections of how confident they recall having been at the time of the identification. Even more surprising is that confirming feedback also distorts the eyewitnesses' recollections of their witnessing conditions (e.g., how good of a view did you have of the perpetrator?) as well as eyewitnesses' recollections of their identification behaviors (e.g., how long did it take you to make the identification?). Simply put, feedback has effects on eyewitnesses' recollections of a wide array of variables. We refer to this as the post-identification feedback effect