Thailand, too, has had a history of engaging and harnessing the power of larger states in its national and regional security strategy, as seen in its alliance with the United States and subsequent alignment with China to deal with the Vietnamese threat in the 1970s and 1980s. More recently, Bangkok has employed a strategy similar to Singapore’s, using multilateral institutions and
trade agreements to draw the major powers into the region as a means of ensuring stability. It has signed FTAs with Australia, China, and India, and is undertaking negotiations with Japan and the United States. Significantly, Thailand is ideally placed to promote pan-regional institutionalism as it sits at the crossroads of Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia. Hence, while both Singapore and Thailand are looking to cultivate India as another potential great power that will take an interest in the region, it is Bangkok that has been more active diplomatically Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s government
has tried assiduously to cultivate ties with South Asia through economic organizations such as BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sir Lanka, and
Thailand Economic Cooperation), and in forging a new transnational dialogue forum—the Asian Cooperation Dialogue—which brings together countries in East and South Asia as well as the Middle East. These moves are largely seen as attempts to boost Thailand’s (and Thanksin,s) leadership role in Asian affairs.
They do reflect a shared belief, however, that “exploiting Thailand’s strategic location to help recover Southeast Asia’s traditional role as a strategic bridge between the different parts of greater Asia will make our whole region
more peaceful.” As one Singaporean minister put it, “Southeast Asia is both a bridge and a buffer between the two great civilizational areas of China and India. Neither China nor India has ever invaded or occupied Southeast Asia because it serves as a useful buffer without impeding trade.”