relations with Great Powers. Opportunism, alliance, and bandwagoning were vital elements of this strategy. Thai leaders also leant to be assertive if situations permitted and to be compliant when choices in foreign policy seemed to be inadequate. The principle of pragmatism resilience has been passed to the subsequent generations of Thai leaders in designing Thailand as a bamboo that leans with the prevailing wind. But doing so also induced a policy dilemma for Thailand.
Because of the lack of colonial experience, and unlike its neighboring countries, Thailand tended to entertain the politics of alliance usually with extra regional Powers instead of strictly upholding neutralism and non-alignment. Thai foreign policy heavily depended on the interests and policies of other Powers, whilst also taking advantage from them in the fulfilment of the country's interests. Thailand kept its open-door policy, despite some brief periods of isolationism, and invited external Powers to compete amongst themselves to win over their alliance with the kingdom. This was a component of Thailand's balance-of-power strategy comprehended that its survival rested on the ability to bend with the wind and its appeasement of external power, even at the expense of occasionally compromising its own moral stance and principles.
The end of the Cold War brought about a new urgency for Thailand to reformulate its foreign policy to react more appropriately to the region's new distribution of power. Thai leaders were challenged by the reality in which the United States, a long-term guardian of Thai national security, was reducing its presence in Southeast Asia and, therefore, its influence on the region. American policy created a power vacuum, but it also paved the way for China, a rising Asian Power, to assert its role as it readjusted the regional equilibrium to its own benefit. Thailand felt that it could no longer depend on the United States alone in times of trouble. The Asian financial crisis that hit Thailand in 1997 reaffirmed this belief. Thailand was disappointed that the United States did not rush to its aid, particularly since the financial crisis was regarded as a new form of threat to the country's economic security. Instead, the Chinese and the Japanese contributed substantial amounts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout fund for Thailand.
A reduced United States presence was not the only major phenomenon in the post-Cold War Period. There have been a number of rising international trends that required Thailand to rethink its traditional foreign policy, which, hitherto, was primarily concerned with the state and the quest to protect its national sovereignty. The new world order is the world of multipolarity, a world with several balancing centres of power driven by the force of globalization in Southeast Asia the mushrooming of new regional and multilateral platforms has gradually eroded the traditional concept of state sovereignty. A corollary to this development is the diversification of actors like non-governmental Organisations and multinational conglomerates, as well as increasingly important non-traditional issues and challenges such as environmental protection, humanitarian disaster relief, terrorism, and epidemics.
Under these circumstances, the need to redefine what constituted national interests to survive the latest shift in international politics was imperative. Domestic conditions equally contributed to the remolding of perceptions of national interest. Traditionally, the foreign policy decision making process was dominated by a tiny elite in the military and the bureaucracy. Together they often depicted the international environment as a highly dangerous domain filed with uncertainties. With the compelling thrust to safeguard national security constantly in their minds, they had been searching for protection from outside Powers, and by doing so, it legotimised their role in foreign-policy formulation. It explains why they were reluctant to abandon the traditional concept even after the Cold War had ended: they feared that they could lose their legitimacy in the conduct of diplomacy
when a new administration led by General Chaticha Choonhavan (1988-91), the first elected prime minister since 1976, was installed in Thailand with an ambition to detraditionalise the
relations with Great Powers. Opportunism, alliance, and bandwagoning were vital elements of this strategy. Thai leaders also leant to be assertive if situations permitted and to be compliant when choices in foreign policy seemed to be inadequate. The principle of pragmatism resilience has been passed to the subsequent generations of Thai leaders in designing Thailand as a bamboo that leans with the prevailing wind. But doing so also induced a policy dilemma for Thailand. Because of the lack of colonial experience, and unlike its neighboring countries, Thailand tended to entertain the politics of alliance usually with extra regional Powers instead of strictly upholding neutralism and non-alignment. Thai foreign policy heavily depended on the interests and policies of other Powers, whilst also taking advantage from them in the fulfilment of the country's interests. Thailand kept its open-door policy, despite some brief periods of isolationism, and invited external Powers to compete amongst themselves to win over their alliance with the kingdom. This was a component of Thailand's balance-of-power strategy comprehended that its survival rested on the ability to bend with the wind and its appeasement of external power, even at the expense of occasionally compromising its own moral stance and principles. The end of the Cold War brought about a new urgency for Thailand to reformulate its foreign policy to react more appropriately to the region's new distribution of power. Thai leaders were challenged by the reality in which the United States, a long-term guardian of Thai national security, was reducing its presence in Southeast Asia and, therefore, its influence on the region. American policy created a power vacuum, but it also paved the way for China, a rising Asian Power, to assert its role as it readjusted the regional equilibrium to its own benefit. Thailand felt that it could no longer depend on the United States alone in times of trouble. The Asian financial crisis that hit Thailand in 1997 reaffirmed this belief. Thailand was disappointed that the United States did not rush to its aid, particularly since the financial crisis was regarded as a new form of threat to the country's economic security. Instead, the Chinese and the Japanese contributed substantial amounts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout fund for Thailand. A reduced United States presence was not the only major phenomenon in the post-Cold War Period. There have been a number of rising international trends that required Thailand to rethink its traditional foreign policy, which, hitherto, was primarily concerned with the state and the quest to protect its national sovereignty. The new world order is the world of multipolarity, a world with several balancing centres of power driven by the force of globalization in Southeast Asia the mushrooming of new regional and multilateral platforms has gradually eroded the traditional concept of state sovereignty. A corollary to this development is the diversification of actors like non-governmental Organisations and multinational conglomerates, as well as increasingly important non-traditional issues and challenges such as environmental protection, humanitarian disaster relief, terrorism, and epidemics. Under these circumstances, the need to redefine what constituted national interests to survive the latest shift in international politics was imperative. Domestic conditions equally contributed to the remolding of perceptions of national interest. Traditionally, the foreign policy decision making process was dominated by a tiny elite in the military and the bureaucracy. Together they often depicted the international environment as a highly dangerous domain filed with uncertainties. With the compelling thrust to safeguard national security constantly in their minds, they had been searching for protection from outside Powers, and by doing so, it legotimised their role in foreign-policy formulation. It explains why they were reluctant to abandon the traditional concept even after the Cold War had ended: they feared that they could lose their legitimacy in the conduct of diplomacy when a new administration led by General Chaticha Choonhavan (1988-91), the first elected prime minister since 1976, was installed in Thailand with an ambition to detraditionalise the
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