and experience of Indonesia and Aceh than the Japanese. But what they had was the
tenacity and boldness of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to nudge both sides
to an agreement. Japan simply lacks a top politician of that caliber and drive.
Moreover, that peace negotiation had the support of Finland and the European Union.
Not surprising, Ahtisaari won the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize.
After the conclusion of a peace accord, the EU and Switzerland, and five
ASEAN countries sent their troops for peace-monitoring but Japan did not. The
peace-monitors were unarmed and were there for confidence-building. Again, Japan
was not prepared to participate in this international peace-monitoring mission. In the
post-conflict consolidation of peace phase in Aceh, Japan basically pursued human
security measures like DDR (Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) of
former combatants, humanitarian assistance and infrastructural development. But
Japan was extremely weak as a mediator and fearful to be a peace-monitor. One
wonders whether ODA in the guise of “human security” is a clutch or an alibi for
Japanese peace-building while not dealing with the critical issues of peacemaking and
peace-monitoring.
At the time of writing, Tokyo still has a golden opportunity to pursue peacebuilding
in Mindanao, the Southern Philippines. This ethnic conflict between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the separatist Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) had already cost around 120,000 lives.xii Then Prime
Minister Koizumi committed Japan to play a larger role to prevent conflict in
Mindanao. When it appeared that a ceasefire between Manila and the MILF would
hold, Japan decided to join the IMT (International Monitoring Team) comprising OIC
(Organization of Islamic Conference) countries of Malaysia, Brunei and Libya for
peace-monitoring. Malaysia and Brunei committed unarmed troops while Libya
dispatched civilians. Tokyo seconded a JICA developmental expert to MOFA who
then joined the IMT. In theory, the JICA developmental expert in the IMT is backed
up by a Mindanao Task Force based in Manila but he is an isolated figure in the field
compared to the contingents dispatched by the OIC countries. This Japanese
developmental expert is supposed to come up with a developmental blueprint for
Mindanao as an incentive for peace. The Japanese embassy in Manila and JICA tried
to come up with a dozen “high impact” human security projects for the civilians in
Muslim Mindanao as an incentive for peace but made no impact on the peace talks.
The peace negotiations led by Malaysia were almost clinched in 2008 when a
compromise was made between the two protagonists: the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines would accept that the MILF would be granted an ‘ancestral
domain” and that villages and areas with a Muslim majority have a right to a later
referendum to decide whether they will join this political entity with considerable
autonomy; and the MILF would abandon separatism. However, the Supreme Court of
the Philippines struck down the deal as unconstitutional and political violence erupted
again. This setback poignantly shows that the fundamental problem in Mindanao is
political --- the politicization of ethnic cleavages and the Moros feeling that their
political rights and cultural identity are ignored by the Filipino state and the
mainstream Catholic society. While Japanese ODA framed as human security can be
helpful to civilians, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to clinch a peace accord.
Simply put, a political problem requires a political solution.
With the advent of the new Aquino Administration, there are hopes that a fresh
start to the peacekeeping process will resume. Just one month after the new