In the aftermath of a series of technological disasters in diverse
industries, one can see how the psychological, social and political
insights associated above and translated into lessons can guide
inquiries and understanding. A series of questions can be derived
from them to sensitise disasters from a learning from accident
viewpoint. For instance, did conflicts of interests between different
actors in the industry lead to difficulties in reporting near misses or
incidents? Were signals reported but not selected due to cognitive
processes involved, or were they reported and selected but not
investigated properly because of failure to adequately mobilise
models? Was there an independent agency in a position to investigate
independently and able to challenge both industry and the
state? Were previous investigations before this accident examples
of ‘fantasy learning’? Were the dynamics between the media, interest
groups, government leaders or industry members unable to
destabilise networks of power in order to change the current situation?
It is clear that the answer to these questions will vary
according to the systems in place in the high risk industries concerned.
One does not expect the exact same problems in learning
in the aviation, nuclear and offshore industries as these industries
do not have the same socio-technical background to learning, or
the same types of accidents.