When the four institutional and corporate governance indicators are included in the
model, the firms located in regions with a more developed legal system are found to be less
likely to employ abnormal gains on debt restructuring to manage earnings (the coefficient
is )0.037 with a )1.91 t-statistic). We also find politically connected firms more likely to
do so, thus suggesting that political connections help firms to obtain debt concessions
from related creditors. This result is consistent with prior findings that political connections
enable firms to obtain loans from banks or other state institutions and to lobby for
government assistance when they are in financial distress (Li, Meng, Wang, and Zhou
2008; Fan, Rui, and Zhao 2008). Moreover, we find evidence to suggest that firms that
employ Big 4 auditors are less likely to use abnormal gains to meet reporting targets,
which points to the importance of audit quality in financial reporting.