The Sri Lankan Case
The literature regarding the Sri Lankan conflict has revolved around providing primordialist, constructivist, and instrumentalist explanations to the growing hostilities.[11] Political scientist Neil DeVotta, while incorporating these perspectives into his theory, focuses on an institutionalist explanation to the question of why the Tamils’ demanded secession.[12] In his comprehensive book Blowback, he outlines his theory as follows:
The more particularistic interactions permeate institutions representing the state, the more likely it is that those marginalized will mobilize in opposition. The more ethnically based such particularism is, the more the state would likely regress to ethnocracy. And when such an ethnocracy and its accompanying institutional decay forces those dispossessed and discriminated against to retaliate by mobilizing along ethnonational lines…the stage will be set for ethnic violence.[13]
This, he posits, is exactly what happened in Sri Lanka. However, in his analysis he emphasizes the large role played by the Sinhala Only language movement as the impetus to the secessionist movement.[14] Although it was a strong catalyst for Tamil grievances and led to much of the other discriminatory policy against the Tamils, DeVotta does not devote enough time to discussing the root cause of all these discriminatory policies: the failure to amend the democratic system inherited from British colonial rule, which allowed for a Sinhalese majority to dominate. As well, he does not give enough credit to the other factors listed by Horowitz, such as migration into the Tamil homeland and the role that violent oppression plays in delegitimizing the state. Therefore, linguistic nationalism is only one of many reasons for the eventual demand for Tamil Eelam by the Tamil people.
Insight can also be drawn from primary sources regarding the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka. Vaithianathan Navaratnam was a Tamil Nationalist and a member of parliament from 1963-1970. In The Fall and Rise of the Tamil Nation, he provides his personal account of the events leading to the Tamil war of independence. As he knew many of the prominent figures personally and actively participated in much of the history, his memoir is a valuable resource in analyzing the causes of the separatist conflict. In particular, he is highly critical of the failure of the Tamil and Sinhalese leadership alike to change the political structure at independence, an issue that is somewhat overlooked in DeVotta’s analysis.[15] Although his judgements may contain personal bias, it is nonetheless a valuable source in trying to encompass the full scope of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.
The Sri Lankan CaseThe literature regarding the Sri Lankan conflict has revolved around providing primordialist, constructivist, and instrumentalist explanations to the growing hostilities.[11] Political scientist Neil DeVotta, while incorporating these perspectives into his theory, focuses on an institutionalist explanation to the question of why the Tamils’ demanded secession.[12] In his comprehensive book Blowback, he outlines his theory as follows: The more particularistic interactions permeate institutions representing the state, the more likely it is that those marginalized will mobilize in opposition. The more ethnically based such particularism is, the more the state would likely regress to ethnocracy. And when such an ethnocracy and its accompanying institutional decay forces those dispossessed and discriminated against to retaliate by mobilizing along ethnonational lines…the stage will be set for ethnic violence.[13]This, he posits, is exactly what happened in Sri Lanka. However, in his analysis he emphasizes the large role played by the Sinhala Only language movement as the impetus to the secessionist movement.[14] Although it was a strong catalyst for Tamil grievances and led to much of the other discriminatory policy against the Tamils, DeVotta does not devote enough time to discussing the root cause of all these discriminatory policies: the failure to amend the democratic system inherited from British colonial rule, which allowed for a Sinhalese majority to dominate. As well, he does not give enough credit to the other factors listed by Horowitz, such as migration into the Tamil homeland and the role that violent oppression plays in delegitimizing the state. Therefore, linguistic nationalism is only one of many reasons for the eventual demand for Tamil Eelam by the Tamil people.Insight can also be drawn from primary sources regarding the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka. Vaithianathan Navaratnam was a Tamil Nationalist and a member of parliament from 1963-1970. In The Fall and Rise of the Tamil Nation, he provides his personal account of the events leading to the Tamil war of independence. As he knew many of the prominent figures personally and actively participated in much of the history, his memoir is a valuable resource in analyzing the causes of the separatist conflict. In particular, he is highly critical of the failure of the Tamil and Sinhalese leadership alike to change the political structure at independence, an issue that is somewhat overlooked in DeVotta’s analysis.[15] Although his judgements may contain personal bias, it is nonetheless a valuable source in trying to encompass the full scope of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.
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The Sri Lankan Case
The literature regarding the Sri Lankan conflict has revolved around providing primordialist, constructivist, and instrumentalist explanations to the growing hostilities.[11] Political scientist Neil DeVotta, while incorporating these perspectives into his theory, focuses on an institutionalist explanation to the question of why the Tamils’ demanded secession.[12] In his comprehensive book Blowback, he outlines his theory as follows:
The more particularistic interactions permeate institutions representing the state, the more likely it is that those marginalized will mobilize in opposition. The more ethnically based such particularism is, the more the state would likely regress to ethnocracy. And when such an ethnocracy and its accompanying institutional decay forces those dispossessed and discriminated against to retaliate by mobilizing along ethnonational lines…the stage will be set for ethnic violence.[13]
This, he posits, is exactly what happened in Sri Lanka. However, in his analysis he emphasizes the large role played by the Sinhala Only language movement as the impetus to the secessionist movement.[14] Although it was a strong catalyst for Tamil grievances and led to much of the other discriminatory policy against the Tamils, DeVotta does not devote enough time to discussing the root cause of all these discriminatory policies: the failure to amend the democratic system inherited from British colonial rule, which allowed for a Sinhalese majority to dominate. As well, he does not give enough credit to the other factors listed by Horowitz, such as migration into the Tamil homeland and the role that violent oppression plays in delegitimizing the state. Therefore, linguistic nationalism is only one of many reasons for the eventual demand for Tamil Eelam by the Tamil people.
Insight can also be drawn from primary sources regarding the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka. Vaithianathan Navaratnam was a Tamil Nationalist and a member of parliament from 1963-1970. In The Fall and Rise of the Tamil Nation, he provides his personal account of the events leading to the Tamil war of independence. As he knew many of the prominent figures personally and actively participated in much of the history, his memoir is a valuable resource in analyzing the causes of the separatist conflict. In particular, he is highly critical of the failure of the Tamil and Sinhalese leadership alike to change the political structure at independence, an issue that is somewhat overlooked in DeVotta’s analysis.[15] Although his judgements may contain personal bias, it is nonetheless a valuable source in trying to encompass the full scope of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.
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