Since the crisis, most sectors have experienced a reduction in the debt-to-equity ratio. For example, the debt-to-equity ratio for the construction sector fell from 7 percent in 1997 to around 3 in 1999. Similar trends can be observed in manufacturing and commerce. But the level of debt-to-equity remains high, particularly in the construction sector.
Despite progress, some weakness remain, and will increasingly pose a challenge to the government if a real reform has to be achieved. Creditor-driven removal of capacity is by and large not occurring. Even wgere firms have negative equity and whose petitions are likely to be acceoted by the bankruptly court, creditors have in general not filed petitions and as a result assets are not clearing. Few , if any, mergers between distressed firms have occurred. The merger process in Thailand is time consuming and onerous, requiring a six-month notification period during which creditors may object to the merger or demand immediate payment. The law enquires that the two merged entitles lose legal status before creating a new legal entity out of the two independent units. The authorities need to consider removal of these impediments to streamline market-led mergers and acquisitions.
Malaysia and Thailand compared: a tentative assessment
By comparing both countries’ restructuring efforts, a number of areas can be identified where Malaysia and Thailand showed similar features: policy and structural weaknesses, corporate debt restructuring, openness to foreign direct investment. On the other hand, there are some issues, whose analysis clearly shows the different approaches adopted by the two governments-capital control measures, financial sector restructuring, presence of political hurdles.
Policy and structural weaknesses
Before the crisis, a feature of both Malaysia and Thailand, as of most east Asian countries, was the coexistence of uninterrupted growth and both policy and structural weaknesses in the banking and corporate sectors, weaknesses that were magnified by growing capital inflows before the crisis and their subsequent massive reversal. Among the structural weaknesses were ineffective bank regulation and supervision and poor accounting and disclosure, each significantly diminishing transparency. Many family-run conglomerates owned banks and exerted influence over governments, while bad laws and ineffective courts contributed to inadequate protection of minority shareholders. Well before the crisis, East Asian governments sought to influence the allocation of funds in the economy. The resulting banking system relied on tacit government approval of large loans (to sectors, if not to individual firms), and it was understood that major banks would not be allowed to fail. Furthermore, these weaknesses reinforced each other: efforts to upgrade supervision were undermined by the political connections of powerful banks. This tendency toward high corporate leverage was compounded by the controlling owner’reluctance to cede control or to disclose much information.
In addition, policy flaws mad the crisis worse. Foreign exchange policies provided stable exchange rates for extended periods, reducing the perceived risks of borrowing and lending in foreign currency, thereby encouraging the growth of foreign currency debt and discouraging the use of hedging instruments. Governments also fostered foreign currency intermediation directly, through arrangements such as the Bangkok international banking facility (where foreign bank loans grew from $8 billion in 1993 to $50 billion in 1996) and indirectly, through higher taxation of local relative to foreign currency immediation. More generally, the liberalization of domestic financial systems and capital flows since the late 1980s occurred without parallel strengthening of prudential regulation and supervision, facilitating greater risk-taking by financial institutions.