Rule systems that are perceived by state actors as legitimate may exert a natural pull to compliance because their very 'appropriateness', in March and Olsen's (1998) terms, effectively makes the choice an invisible one. This is altogether different from rule compliance motivated by either the fear of negative sanctions or the instrumental pursuit of self-interest (Hund 1999). Here we also see a close conceptual connection between legitimacy and identity. Whereas interests in the neo-realist paradigm are assumed to be exogenous to forceful and self-interested interactions, in the case of legitimacy a state complies because it fundamentally identifies with the basic rightness of the rule. In effect, the promotion of ASEAN's legitimacy through identity bonds is key to the constructivist vision of the organization's future.
Constructivists also see identity formation as something that can be approached empirically and which can be measured in a qualified way (e.g. Acharya 2001; Garofano 2002; Johnston 2003; Sharpe 2003). The logic of the approach is simple: if it can be demonstrated that group social cohesion is increasing as a result of the density and quality of interactions among members than this bodes well for ASEAN's future. Ravenhill’s (2001: 219) observation that politicians, bureaucrats and non-governmental representatives attend over 300 official ASEAN meetings every year strongly suggests that, in a region of the world in which personal relations are of primary importance, the stock of organizational social capital is high and helps to maintain the social cohesion with which constructivists are concerned.If, on the other hand, identity appears to be on the decline then there are good reasons to be concerned about the organization's power.
In looking to the future it is noticeable that neo-realists and constructivists see ASEAN on different time-horizons.Neo-realists tend to looking at ASEAN in the short to medium term while constructivists look at ASEAN in the medium to long term. To the considerable extent neo-realists measure ASEAN ‘s worth against its present inability to coerce other regional or international actors. Constructivists, however, by viewing power as essentially the ability to act in a concerted way, take the long view in trying to assess where the Association is headed. ASEAN’s role in the ARF and the Association’s ability to steer the ARF so that it can enhance security in East Asia is reflective of these views, Similarly on the economic side the Chiang Mai Initiative [CMI], which is intended to strengthen the economic security of the ATP region by helping to prevent currency crises of the sort experienced in 1997, is seen by sceptics as too limited and of little value. Although there are fourteen bilateral swap agreements [BSAs] currently in effect totalling US$52.5 billion that are intended to provide help in the event of a speculative attack against the value of a country’s currency, no one country will have access to more than a few billion dollars [Bank of Japan 2005]. Similarly, the ASEAN Surveillance Mechanism [ASM] that goes along with the CMI is limited in its effectiveness. Yet for a number of more optimistic ASEAN- watchers, the long-term benefits of state interaction in building up the CMI's BSAs, the possibility of pooling the region's central bank resources to underwrite the BSAs, and the benefits of the exchange of information that has accompanied attempts to implement the ASM are seen as positive development (Manupipatpong 2002: 16).They are viewed as being part of an East Asian regional socialization process that helps to create regional identity building while at the same time enhancing the ability of ASEAN members to act in the face of any future currency crisis.