involves both an individual changing the entities with which he/she comes into
contact, while simultaneously being changed by the entities through the cultural
exchanges that unfold. Thus, it is found that twentieth-century British philosopher
Michael Oakeshott’s view on (higher) education is concerned with the world into
which individuals are initiated, one that is composed of skills, languages, practices
and manners of activity, out of which ‘things’ are generated (Roland Martin 2013,
9). That is, the entities in which individuals are initiated change the individuals, and
simultaneously the individuals themselves are changed by the entities – a matter
of cultural exchanges that occur between individuals and other entities (Roland
Martin 2013, 9). Consequently, (higher) education as an encounter unfolds when
individuals interact with other entities (other individuals) on the basis of their cultural
understandings. When the cultural perspective is missing, a significant portion of the
educational process is lost as well (Roland Martin 2013, 9).
Roland Martin’s theory of education holds that (higher) education only occurs if
there is an encounter between an individual and a culture in which one or more of
the individual’s capacities and one or more items of a culture’s stock become yoked
together (or attached) (Roland Martin 2013, 17). In essence, whenever capacities and
stock meet and become attached to one another, then (higher) education occurs. In
agreement with such a view of education, I contend that (higher) education for social
justice should always be considered as an encounter amongst individuals, groups
and/or other entities. This means that individuals and others bring to the encounter
their capacities (for learning) and cultural understandings and, in turn, together
shape the particular encounter. And when the aim of (higher) education is to achieve
social justice, the capacities and cultural stock of individuals should invariably be
geared towards attaining social justice. Hence, (higher) education for social justice
has a better chance of being realised if treated as an encounter, because an encounter
would be attached to the capacities that individuals bring to change both entities as
well as their cultural stock. And the change process that individuals undergo when
their capacities and cultural stock become yoked together is what is called learning
(Roland Martin 2013, 19). Now that I have explained (higher) education for social
justice as an encounter, I will expound more specifically on this notion of (higher)
education for social justice.
Any attempt at expounding on (higher) education for social justice requires
some further explanations of (higher) education and social justice respectively. I
specifically examine the concepts (higher) education and social justice separately,
because education for something (in this instance, social justice) implies that people
understand what education is meant for. Therefore, looking at social justice would
give people some idea of the intended aims of (higher) education. Previously I argued
that (higher) education ought to be considered as an encounter. This encounter, I
now posit, has to be aimed at achieving social justice. So, what does social justice
involve? Crudely put, when people discuss the concept of social justice in particular,
and argues that when some policy or some state of affairs is socially unjust, then
they are claiming that a person, or category of persons, enjoys fewer advantages than
that person or category of persons ought to enjoy in society (Miller 2003, 1). Social
justice is regarded as an aspect of distributive justice, where the latter, according to
the philosopher Aristotle, is concerned with the fair distribution of benefits among
the members of various associations (Miller 2003, 2).
The allocation of valued goods (money and commodities, property, jobs and
offices, education, medical care, child benefits and child care, honours and prizes,
personal security, housing, transportation, and leisure opportunities) and of devalued
goods (military service, degrading or hard work and care for the elderly) depends
on the workings of the major social institutions (Miller 2003, 7). Thus, individuals
should be careful not to understand the term ‘distributed’ literally, but rather to look
at Rawls’s ‘basic structure of society’, which is concerned more with the ways in
which a range of social institutions and practices together influence the shares of
resources available to different people (Miller 2003, 11). There is no doubt that
the state is the primary institution whose policies and practices contribute to social
justice or injustice, as the state has a major influence on the shares going to each
person by enacting property laws, determining taxes, organising the provision of
health care, and so forth (Miller 2003, 11). However, the state itself would be largely
impotent if it were not for the collaboration of other major institutions and agencies
(Miller 2003, 12).
Central to any theory of justice will be an account of the basic rights of citizens,
such as freedom of speech and movement, in terms of which people are empowered to
deliberate and express their feelings with others in debates and discussions pertaining
to particular topics at hand. Also, one of the most contested and inextricable issues
arising in debates about freedom is whether and when a lack of resources constitutes
a constraint on freedom (Miller 2003, 13). The issue of school fees poses a great
challenge for many learners from disadvantaged backgrounds, and thus begs the
question how freedom could in fact be attained. Iris Marion Young’s rendition of
social justice centrally requires ‘the elimination of institutionalized domination and
oppression’, and distributive issues should be tackled from this perspective (Miller
2003, 15). Here, concerns for personal autonomy and personal development are
instrumental if people are to be empowered to make their own decisions. Power
needs to be decentralised to allow people to make their own decisions in the pursuit
of social justice. According to Miller (2003, 247), in order for society to be just
it must comply with the principles of need, desert (reward) and equality, whereby
institutional structures must ensure that an adequate share of social resources is
set aside for individuals on the basis of need. Social justice thus requires that the
allocating agencies be set up in such a way that vital needs, such as food, medical
resources and housing, become the criteria for distributing the various resources for
each of the specific needs (Miller 2003, 247). Also, a main issue for social justice is
economic desert, which is how people are rewarded for the work that they perform to
encompass productive activities, such as innovation, management and labour (Miller
2003, 248). The reward for performance should serve as an incentive for the working
class to improve their productivity and efficiency.