Big Powers and World Order
Towards Multipolarity?
After the Cold War the US emerged as the sole superpower. American neoconservatives were quick to describe the consequence as the "unipolar moment" which, they argued, gave America the God sent chance to reshape the world according to its own designs without the need to consider too many international obligations or the views of other states. That vision ha s foundered on the ongoing violence of Iraq, the discovery that even American power has its limits and that the legitimacy of America's leadership has been undermined by its disregard for international law and its violation of human rights in connection with Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and the practice of rendition.
The multipolar world which President Vladimir Putin and President Jacques Chirac evoked in 20036 is, in fact, emerging, although not necessarily as the counterweight to US power, as some French protagonists hoped and some Americans dread. Most of our big powers represent such poles on the world scene. Russia is staging a comeback based on energy power. In about two decades China will surpass all economies except the US and already is a major trading power and holder of foreign currency. Britain and France, like China and Russia, are Permanent Members of the Security Council. Germany has returned as Europe's biggest economy and the world's largest exporter, and its military plays an increasing role outside Europe as does its diplomacy, notably as part of the EU Three on the Iranian issue. Japan is not only the second economy in the world and still Asia's central economy but has developed an active diplomacy both in Asia and on the global level. Brazil, India, and South Africa are still primarily regional powers but are set on a path towards a global posture.
Moreover, the European Union, with three of the big powers playing a leading role in it, has become a significant actor in the field of trade and one of the major actors in the Doha Round. It is the largest donor of development aid, providing about half the world's ODA. In the field of foreign and security policy it has repeatedly succeeded in translating its common strategy into action, for example, in the "Quartet" on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Since the Union's enlargement to 27 members has inevitably increased its internal diversity, the only chance to have more common policies will depend on whether the essential institutional elements of the rejected Constitutional Treaty can be resurrected. Nevertheless it will take many years for the EU to have a genuine and all encompassing common foreign and security policy. In the meantime the solution of the "EU Three" acting in consultation with other members and involving the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, as in the ongoing negotiations with Iran, may be prove to be a viable approach for some time to come on various issues.
In the multipolar world the US still remains by far the most powerful country; with a defense budget roughly equivalent to that of the rest of the world. It yields enormous influence but can no longer necessarily impose its will, as the second Bush Administration has discovered at great cost. In some areas other powers are conducting what has been called "soft balancing" against the primacy of the US to protect their own postition.7 For example, Britain, France and Germany acted indirectly against the US by opposing its decision to go to war in Iraq while studiously avoiding any support of the Iraqi regime. As has been righty noted, despite considerable disagreements with the policies of the second Bush Administration, there has been no real counterbalancing comparable to the traditions of the 19th and 20th century.8
Big powers cooperate in numerous areas: bilaterally, in groups as well as with the US, particularly now that the Bush Administration has adopted a more cooperative and multilateral style in its second term. While the US has rediscovered that most, if not all of its strategic problems require the contribution of partners, the world in turn is aware of the fact that the solution to every major problem of world order requires US support without, however, necessarily endorsing at this stage of US policy the concept of the US as "the world's best source of global governance
Big Powers and World Order
Towards Multipolarity?
After the Cold War the US emerged as the sole superpower. American neoconservatives were quick to describe the consequence as the "unipolar moment" which, they argued, gave America the God sent chance to reshape the world according to its own designs without the need to consider too many international obligations or the views of other states. That vision ha s foundered on the ongoing violence of Iraq, the discovery that even American power has its limits and that the legitimacy of America's leadership has been undermined by its disregard for international law and its violation of human rights in connection with Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and the practice of rendition.
The multipolar world which President Vladimir Putin and President Jacques Chirac evoked in 20036 is, in fact, emerging, although not necessarily as the counterweight to US power, as some French protagonists hoped and some Americans dread. Most of our big powers represent such poles on the world scene. Russia is staging a comeback based on energy power. In about two decades China will surpass all economies except the US and already is a major trading power and holder of foreign currency. Britain and France, like China and Russia, are Permanent Members of the Security Council. Germany has returned as Europe's biggest economy and the world's largest exporter, and its military plays an increasing role outside Europe as does its diplomacy, notably as part of the EU Three on the Iranian issue. Japan is not only the second economy in the world and still Asia's central economy but has developed an active diplomacy both in Asia and on the global level. Brazil, India, and South Africa are still primarily regional powers but are set on a path towards a global posture.
Moreover, the European Union, with three of the big powers playing a leading role in it, has become a significant actor in the field of trade and one of the major actors in the Doha Round. It is the largest donor of development aid, providing about half the world's ODA. In the field of foreign and security policy it has repeatedly succeeded in translating its common strategy into action, for example, in the "Quartet" on the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Since the Union's enlargement to 27 members has inevitably increased its internal diversity, the only chance to have more common policies will depend on whether the essential institutional elements of the rejected Constitutional Treaty can be resurrected. Nevertheless it will take many years for the EU to have a genuine and all encompassing common foreign and security policy. In the meantime the solution of the "EU Three" acting in consultation with other members and involving the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, as in the ongoing negotiations with Iran, may be prove to be a viable approach for some time to come on various issues.
In the multipolar world the US still remains by far the most powerful country; with a defense budget roughly equivalent to that of the rest of the world. It yields enormous influence but can no longer necessarily impose its will, as the second Bush Administration has discovered at great cost. In some areas other powers are conducting what has been called "soft balancing" against the primacy of the US to protect their own postition.7 For example, Britain, France and Germany acted indirectly against the US by opposing its decision to go to war in Iraq while studiously avoiding any support of the Iraqi regime. As has been righty noted, despite considerable disagreements with the policies of the second Bush Administration, there has been no real counterbalancing comparable to the traditions of the 19th and 20th century.8
Big powers cooperate in numerous areas: bilaterally, in groups as well as with the US, particularly now that the Bush Administration has adopted a more cooperative and multilateral style in its second term. While the US has rediscovered that most, if not all of its strategic problems require the contribution of partners, the world in turn is aware of the fact that the solution to every major problem of world order requires US support without, however, necessarily endorsing at this stage of US policy the concept of the US as "the world's best source of global governance
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