Political science has paid scant attention to
the way that citizens judge public policy,
assuming that citizens do so, or should do
so, in ways familiar to academics themselves.
This means that the accounts and expectations
of academics and policy-makers frequently
overemphasise conscious, rational analysis
and miss—or dismiss—the powerful emotional
underpinnings of citizen judgement.
This paper focuses on aligning our conceptions
of such judgements more closely with
political reality than, it will argue, they are at
the moment.
In the next section, the claim is that the
main schools in political science and policy
studies include concepts of citizens’ judgement
of policy which are mostly onedimensional
and assumed without much
examination, because they fit the more general
purposes and intellectual styles of the
scholarly schools in question. Some of these
conceptions are explicit, some are implicit;
some are intended to be positive, some to be
normative; but most of them fail to meet the
test of political reality relative to alternatives
which can be drawn from psychology and
cognitive science.
In the third section, research on judgement
and decision-making from psychology and
neuroscience is examined with a view to
augmenting the most promising of the political
science accounts of judgement, that of
political psychology. In the fourth section of
the paper, a moral psychology for public life is
set out, on the basis of research and speculation
from cognitive science. A brief conclusion
follows.
Political science has paid scant attention tothe way that citizens judge public policy,assuming that citizens do so, or should doso, in ways familiar to academics themselves.This means that the accounts and expectationsof academics and policy-makers frequentlyoveremphasise conscious, rational analysisand miss—or dismiss—the powerful emotionalunderpinnings of citizen judgement.This paper focuses on aligning our conceptionsof such judgements more closely withpolitical reality than, it will argue, they are atthe moment.In the next section, the claim is that themain schools in political science and policystudies include concepts of citizens’ judgementof policy which are mostly onedimensionaland assumed without muchexamination, because they fit the more generalpurposes and intellectual styles of thescholarly schools in question. Some of theseconceptions are explicit, some are implicit;some are intended to be positive, some to benormative; but most of them fail to meet thetest of political reality relative to alternativeswhich can be drawn from psychology andcognitive science.In the third section, research on judgementand decision-making from psychology andneuroscience is examined with a view toaugmenting the most promising of the politicalscience accounts of judgement, that ofpolitical psychology. In the fourth section ofthe paper, a moral psychology for public life isset out, on the basis of research and speculationfrom cognitive science. A brief conclusionfollows.
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