Academics’ debate is usually referred to financial instruments and framed within the agency theory, supposing information asymmetry between market participants and the existence of perfect versus imperfect market conditions. Barth and Landsman (1995) concluded that in perfect and complete markets a fair value accounting-based balance sheet reflects all value-relevant information. However, in more realistic market settings management discretion applied to fair valuation can detract from balance sheet and income statement relevance. Watts (2003) argues that fair valuation is subject to more
manipulation and, accordingly, is a poorer measure of worth and performance. Rayman (2007) concludes that fair value accounting is liable to produce absurdities and misleading information, if it is based on expectations that turn out to be false. In the same vein, Liang and Wen (2007) are critical with the beneficial effects of moving to fair valuation because it inherits more managerial manipulation and induce less efficient investment decisions than cost valuations. Plantin and Sapra (forthcoming) conclude that, when there are imperfections in the market, there is the danger of the emergence of
an additional source of volatility as a consequence of fair valuation, and thus a rapid shift to full mark-to-market regime may be detrimental to financial intermediation and therefore to economic growth. On the contrary, Bleck and Liu (2007) found that historic cost accounting makes easier to hinder bad investment projects, prevents from liquidating them, therefore accumulating volatility to hit the market at a later date and produce crash prices, increasing overall volatility and reducing efficiency (i.e. reducing profitability) with respect to market valuation. Gigler et al. (2006) concluded that even
in the case of mixed attribute report (i.e., some items are valued at market while others are carried at historical cost), fair value performs better: it provides stronger signals of financial distress. All these previous mentioned studies are analytical and mainly use mathematical models. However, to our knowledge, there are few empirical studies contrasting hypotheses on these issues. Hann et al. (2007) found empirical evidence of fair-value pension accounting not improving the informativeness of the financial statements and even impairing it. Slightly related to these issues, Beaver et al. (2005)
found a small decline in the ability of financial ratios to predict bankruptcy from 1962 to 2002, and an incremental explanatory power of market-related variables over this period. They explain the deterioration of predictive ability of financial ratios in terms of an insufficient improvement of FASB standards.
Academics’ debate is usually referred to financial instruments and framed within the agency theory, supposing information asymmetry between market participants and the existence of perfect versus imperfect market conditions. Barth and Landsman (1995) concluded that in perfect and complete markets a fair value accounting-based balance sheet reflects all value-relevant information. However, in more realistic market settings management discretion applied to fair valuation can detract from balance sheet and income statement relevance. Watts (2003) argues that fair valuation is subject to more
manipulation and, accordingly, is a poorer measure of worth and performance. Rayman (2007) concludes that fair value accounting is liable to produce absurdities and misleading information, if it is based on expectations that turn out to be false. In the same vein, Liang and Wen (2007) are critical with the beneficial effects of moving to fair valuation because it inherits more managerial manipulation and induce less efficient investment decisions than cost valuations. Plantin and Sapra (forthcoming) conclude that, when there are imperfections in the market, there is the danger of the emergence of
an additional source of volatility as a consequence of fair valuation, and thus a rapid shift to full mark-to-market regime may be detrimental to financial intermediation and therefore to economic growth. On the contrary, Bleck and Liu (2007) found that historic cost accounting makes easier to hinder bad investment projects, prevents from liquidating them, therefore accumulating volatility to hit the market at a later date and produce crash prices, increasing overall volatility and reducing efficiency (i.e. reducing profitability) with respect to market valuation. Gigler et al. (2006) concluded that even
in the case of mixed attribute report (i.e., some items are valued at market while others are carried at historical cost), fair value performs better: it provides stronger signals of financial distress. All these previous mentioned studies are analytical and mainly use mathematical models. However, to our knowledge, there are few empirical studies contrasting hypotheses on these issues. Hann et al. (2007) found empirical evidence of fair-value pension accounting not improving the informativeness of the financial statements and even impairing it. Slightly related to these issues, Beaver et al. (2005)
found a small decline in the ability of financial ratios to predict bankruptcy from 1962 to 2002, and an incremental explanatory power of market-related variables over this period. They explain the deterioration of predictive ability of financial ratios in terms of an insufficient improvement of FASB standards.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..