Chaves and Cann (1992) extended this argument by using empirical measures of
the extent of state involvement and interference with church activities. Greater state
regulation of religion—which Chaves and Cann measured by, among other things,
whether the government appoints or approves church leaders—was argued to decrease
the efficiency of religion providers and, therefore, to generate lower rates of church
attendance. However, state religion also typically involves subsidies, such as payments
to church employees, and the collection of taxes dedicated to church uses. Economic
reasoning suggests that these subsidies would encourage formal religious activity—
hence, the overall impact of a subsidized state church on religious participation could be
positive.
Chaves and Cann (1992) extended this argument by using empirical measures ofthe extent of state involvement and interference with church activities. Greater stateregulation of religion—which Chaves and Cann measured by, among other things,whether the government appoints or approves church leaders—was argued to decreasethe efficiency of religion providers and, therefore, to generate lower rates of churchattendance. However, state religion also typically involves subsidies, such as paymentsto church employees, and the collection of taxes dedicated to church uses. Economicreasoning suggests that these subsidies would encourage formal religious activity—hence, the overall impact of a subsidized state church on religious participation could bepositive.
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