Trust between community members and prior organisational experience contribute to a favourable environment for the self-governance of forest resources (Balland and Plateau 1996; Ostrom 1990, 1992). Communities with high levels of trust and reciprocity face lower costs of monitoring and sanctioning. These costs include fencing and patrolling forest areas, building monitoring structures, and sanctioning violators. Transaction costs may form a barrier to collaboration and to the establishment of appropriate tenure arrangements (Bromley 1991). If local people had already voluntarily and successfully worked together through local associations, they would have acquired organisational skills and experience of social interactions that facilitate the establishment of community forestry initiatives. Communities with little organisational and associative experience are more dependent on external support and intervention to agree upon institutional changes and to adopt new rules governing common pool resources. In turn, the imposition of unfamiliar sustainable forestry practices by external stakeholders, such as international organisations and governmental agencies, may not gather sufficient long-lasting local support.