The international system—as constructed
following the Second World War—will be
almost unrecognizable by 2025. Indeed,
“international system” is a misnomer as it is
likely to be more ramshackle than orderly, its
composition hybrid and heterogeneous as
befits a transition that will still be a work in
progress in 2025. The transformation is being
fueled by a globalizing economy, marked by
an historic shift of relative wealth and
economic power from West to East, and by
the increasing weight of new players—
especially China and India. The US will
remain the single most important actor but
will be less dominant. As was true of the
United States in the 19th and 20th centuries,
China and India will at times be reticent and
at other times impatient to assume larger roles
on the world stage. In 2025, both will still be
more concerned about their own internal
development than changing the international
system.
Concurrent with the shift in power among
nation-states, the relative power of various
nonstate actors—including businesses, tribes,
religious organizations, and even criminal
networks—will continue to increase. Several
countries could even be “taken over” and run
by criminal networks. In areas of Africa or
South Asia, states as we know them might
wither away, owing to the inability of
governments to provide for basic needs,
including security.
By 2025, the international community will be
composed of many actors in addition to
nation-states and will lack an overarching
approach to global governance. The “system”
will be multipolar with many clusters of both
state and nonstate actors. Multipolar
international systems—like the Concert of
Europe—have existed in the past, but the one
that is emerging is unprecedented because it is
global and encompasses a mix of state and
nonstate actors that are not grouped into rival
camps of roughly equal weight. The most
salient characteristics of the “new order” will
be the shift from a unipolar world dominated
by the United States to a relatively
unstructured hierarchy of old powers and
rising nations, and the diffusion of power
from state to nonstate actors.
“…we do not believe that we are headed
toward a complete breakdown [of the
international system]…However, the next 20
years of transition toward a new
international system are fraught with
risks…”
History tells us that rapid change brings many
dangers. Despite the recent financial
volatility, which could end up accelerating
many ongoing trends, we do not believe that
we are headed toward a complete
breakdown—as occurred in 1914-1918 when
an earlier phase of globalization came to a
halt. However, the next 20 years of transition
toward a new international system are fraught
with risks—more than we envisaged when we
published Mapping the Global Future3 in
2004. These risks include the growing
prospect of a nuclear arms race in the Middle
East and possible interstate conflicts over
resources. The breadth of transnational
issues requiring attention also is increasing to
include issues connected with resource
constraints in energy, food, and water; and
worries about climate change. Global
institutions that could help the world deal
with these transnational issues and, more
generally, mitigate the risks of rapid change
currently appear incapable of rising to the