5. Conclusions
Earnings management has attracted more attention from market regulators since the
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big Enron and WorldCom scandals. Even though earnings management cannot be seen as
accounting fraud, it leads to information asymmetry between inside managers and outside
investors. Motivated by this background, this study aims to explore whether audit
committee and characteristics of board of directors influence earnings management. The
method of synthesis review is employed to implement this study, which selects 20
empirical studies about earnings management. SOX is seen as the Watershed in this study.
Through discussing and analyzing the findings of selected literatures, it is evident that
earnings management is very difficult to measure. That is to say, earnings can be managed
through a variety of operating activities and accrual methods. The Jones model and
modified Jones model turn out to be the most powerful in detecting earnings management.
Kothari et al. (2005) model is relatively new and seeks to fill some of the voids in the
Jones and modified Jones models. The majority of previous studies consistently find that
audit committee independence plays a significant role in reducing earnings management in
pre-SOX era because weak audit committee independence can provide chances and space
for earnings management. SOX is proven to be efficient and powerful in enhancing audit
committee independence. An overwhelming majority of prior literature finds that a board
with independent directors is efficient in restricting earnings management. Moreover,
outside directors with financial expertise and experience are associated with lower level of
earnings management. However, when it comes to overlapping membership on reducing
earnings management, the results are mixed and thus inconclusive.
Findings of this study indicate that managers should take more actions to reduce
earnings management to ensure the long-term development of their companies. Moreover,
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reform is needed to systematically increase the independence of board members. For
market regulators, more attention should be given to limiting abnormal and discretionary
accruals, both of which tend to be associated with earnings management. For policy
makers and standard setters, accounting policies and standards on earnings disclosure
should be more detailed and strict. For instance, when accounts are adjusted to smoothen
earnings, these adjustments must be disclosed in the financial statements in order to ensure
the transparency of financial reporting.
Although there are studies with the theme which is similar to this study, the data and
information in those studies are gathered to serve the objectives of those studies within
their unique economic framework. Additionally, most pre-SOX studies focus on countries
abroad while post-SOX studies are limited mainly to the U.S. Finally, as this study cannot
fully cover the literature review on earnings management, thus this study will present
some limitations.
For future research on the association between earnings management and audit
committee and board characteristics, one should remember that each country market will
come with its own standards, regulations and culture.