For Maritain, the best political order is one which recognizes the sovereignty of God. He rejects, therefore, not only fascism and communism, but all secular humanisms. He objects that such views — particularly fascism and communism — are not only secular religions, but dehumanizing and, while he was a defender of American-style democracy, he is clearly not interested in combining his attachment to Christianity with capitalism. A theocentric humanism, Maritain would argue, has its philosophical foundation in the recognition of the nature of the human person as a spiritual and material being — a being that has a relation to God — and morality and social and political institutions must therefore reflect this.
Maritain envisages a political society under the rule of law — and he distinguishes four types of law: the eternal, the natural, the ‘common law of civilisation’ (droit des gens or jus gentium), and the positive (droit positif).
The natural law is "universal and invariable" and deals with "the rights and duties which follow [necessarily] from the first principle" (see Man and the State, pp. 97-98) or precept of law — that good is to be done and evil avoided. Nevertheless, while the natural law is "self-evident" (see Man and the State, p. 90) and consistent with and confirmed by experience — something which many critics have challenged — Maritain holds that it is not founded on human nature. It is rooted in divine reason and in a transcendent order (i.e., in the eternal law), and is ‘written into’ human nature by God. At times, Maritain appears to hold that natural law acquires its obligatory character only because of its relation to the eternal law; he writes that "natural law is law only because it is participation in Eternal Law" (see Man and the State, p. 96). (Some have concluded, then, that such a theory must be ultimately theological.)
The droit des gens or ‘common law of civilisation’ is an extension of the natural law to the circumstances of life in society, and thus it is concerned with human beings as social beings (e.g., as citizens or as members of families). The ‘positive law’ is the system of rules and regulations involved in assuring general order within a particular society. It varies according to the stage of social or economic development within that community and according to the specific activities of individuals within it. Neither the positive law nor the droit des gens is, however, deducible from the natural law alone. Neither is known connaturally and, therefore, is not part of the natural law. Nevertheless, it is in virtue of their relation to natural law that they "have the force of law and impose themselves on conscience" (Les droits de l'homme, pp. 90-1). When a positive law acts against the natural law, it is, strictly speaking, not a law. Thus, Maritain clearly rejects legal positivism.
The term ‘natural law’ and its relations both to ‘eternal law’ and to positive law have, however, been the focus of much controversy. Maritain's account of natural law both presupposes a metaphysical view of the nature of human beings and a realistic epistemology, and has a number of tensions or inconsistencies internal to it. Some of the principal criticisms of this account are i) that it is inconsistent because it sets forth a naturalistic theory of what is good and bad and yet claims that only a supernatural sanction will serve to explain moral obligation, ii) that connatural knowledge is not only inadequate for what we normally count as knowledge, but it is, in fact, also incapable of establishing that something is a natural moral law, iii) that the first principle of moral law is vacuous, and iv) that Maritain glosses over the fact/value distinction.
Maritain held that natural law theory entailed an account of human rights. Since the natural end of each person is to achieve moral and spiritual perfection, it is necessary to have the means to do so, i.e., to have rights which, since they serve to realise his or her nature, are called ‘natural’. This respects the Aristotelian-Thomistic principle of justice, that we should distribute to each ‘what is truly his or hers’. Maritain replies to the criticism that there are no such rights, since they are not universally recognised, by reminding his readers that, just as the natural law comes to be recognised gradually and over time, so also is there a gradual recognition of rights. Indeed, Maritain held that certain basic natural rights can be recognised by all, without there having to be agreement on their foundation and, as an illustration of this, he pointed to the general agreement on those rights found in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
Maritain held that natural rights are fundamental and inalienable, and antecedent in nature, and superior, to society. Still, they should not be understood as ‘antecedent’ in a temporal sense and do not form the basis of the state or of the civil law. Rights are grounded in the natural law, and specifically in relation to the common good. It is this good, and not individual rights, that is the basis of the state, and it is because of this that Maritain held that there can be a hierarchical ordering of these rights (Man and the State, p. 106-7).
One consequence of his natural law and natural rights theory is that Maritain favoured a democratic and liberal view of the state, and argued for a political society that is both personalist, pluralist, and Christianly-inspired. He held that the authority to rule derives from the people — for people have a natural right to govern themselves. Still, this is consistent with a commitment to Christianity, Maritain thought, because the ideals of democracy are themselves inspired by a belief in God's rule, and that the primary source of all authority is God (Man and the State, p, 127).
Maritain also favoured a number of liberal ideals, and the list of rights that he recognises extends significantly beyond that found in many liberal theories, and includes the rights of workers as well as those of the human and the civic person.
Furthermore, the ideal of freedom or liberty to be found in the state is close to that which is now generally called ‘positive freedom’ — i.e., one that reflects a view of the person as sharing in a common good. As a polity that attempts to provide the conditions for the realisation of the human person as an individual who is, thereby, a member of a temporal community, it recognises that the use of goods by individuals must serve the good of all (Integral Humanism, p. 184), and that individuals can be required to serve the community. Moreover, in such a state political leaders would be more than just spokespersons for the people (Man and the State, p. 140), and Maritain recognises that they can represent the ‘hidden will’ of the people. Their aim — and the aim of the state as a whole — is, however, always the common good. Since minorities may themselves reflect this ‘hidden will,’ Maritain also recognised the important role to be played by dissenting minorities.
(Maritain does not discuss in any detail how his model ‘Christian’ polity might be realised, but suggests that it is the only one that takes account of each person's spiritual worth and that recognises the importance of providing the means to foster one's growth as a person. It recognises differences of religious conscience and is, in this way, fundamentally pluralistic.)
In such an ideal polity, Maritain imagines that a leadership role would be played by a multiplicity of ‘civic fraternities,’ founded on freedom, inspired by the virtues of Christianity, reflecting a moral and spiritual discipline, and which are fundamentally democratic. While such groups would not necessarily exercise political power, the society as a whole would reflect Christian values — not just because these values are part of a privileged religion or faith (a matter that Maritain would be wary of), but because these are necessary to the temporal community. In such a polity one would, of course, find a church and a state, though Maritain would see them as cooperative entities, with the state occupying itself with those matters that, while focusing on temporal concerns, addressed the needs of the whole of the human person, and with the church focussing on spiritual matters.
It is, perhaps, evident that such a polity could not survive within a single nation state that existed among a plurality of states with different ideals, and so Maritain supported the ideal of a world federation of political societies. While the realisation of such an ideal was something that lay in a distant future, Maritain nevertheless thought that such a federation was possible, providing that the individual states retained a fair degree of autonomy and that persons could be found from each state who would voluntarily distance themselves from the particular interests of their home country.
สำหรับ Maritain สั่งการเมืองส่วนเป็นหนึ่งซึ่งตระหนักถึงอำนาจอธิปไตยของพระเจ้า เขาไม่ยอมรับ ดังนั้น ไม่เพียงฟาสซิสต์ และคอมมิวนิสต์ แต่ทั้งหมดเกี่ยวกับฆราวาส humanisms เขาวัตถุมุมมองดังกล่าวที่ — โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งฟาสซิสต์และคอมมิวนิสต์ — ไม่เพียงศาสนาทางโลก แต่เป็น dehumanizing และ defender ประชาธิปไตยแบบอเมริกัน เขาไม่ชัดเจนสนใจรวมของเขาแนบกับศาสนาคริสต์กับทุนนิยม มนุษยนิยมเป็น theocentric, Maritain จะโต้เถียง มีรากฐานของปรัชญาการรู้ธรรมชาติของมนุษย์เป็นจิตวิญญาณ และวัสดุซึ่งมีความสัมพันธ์กับพระเจ้า — และสถาบันทางสังคม และการเมืองและศีลธรรมต้องดังนั้นMaritain envisages สังคมทางการเมืองภายใต้การปกครองของกฎหมาย — และเขาแยกสี่ชนิดของกฎหมาย: อีเทอร์นอล ธรรมชาติ 'ทั่วไปกฎหมายยัง' (droit des gens หรือกลาง gentium), และบวก (droit positif)กฎหมายธรรมชาติเป็น "สากล และปรากฏ" และกับ "สิทธิและหน้าที่ซึ่งตามหลักแรก [จำเป็น]" (ดูมนุษย์และรัฐ นำ 97-98) หรือ precept กฎหมาย — ดีที่จะทำได้ และหลีกเลี่ยงความชั่วร้าย อย่างไรก็ตาม ขณะกฎหมายธรรมชาติเป็น "วีรกรรม" (ดูมนุษย์และรัฐ p. 90) และสอดคล้องกับ และได้รับการยืนยันจากประสบการณ์ — สิ่งที่นักวิจารณ์หลายได้ท้าทาย — Maritain ถือว่า มันไม่ก่อตั้งขึ้นในธรรมชาติมนุษย์นั้น มันจะใช้ ในเหตุผลของพระเจ้า และการดาร (เช่น ในกฎหมายนิรันดร์), และ 'เขียนเป็น' ธรรมชาติมนุษย์ โดยพระเจ้า ตลอดเวลา Maritain ปรากฏให้ ถือว่า กฎหมายธรรมชาติได้ฝึกฝนอักขระตัวบังคับเท่านั้นเนื่องจากความสัมพันธ์ของกฎหมายนิรันดร เขาเขียนว่า "กฎหมายธรรมชาติเป็นกฎหมายเฉพาะเนื่องจากในกฎหมายนิรันดร์" (ดูมนุษย์และรัฐ p. 96) (บางได้สรุป แล้ว ว่า ทฤษฎีดังกล่าวต้องสุดศาสนศาสตร์)Droit des gens หรือ 'ทั่วไปกฎหมายยัง' เป็นส่วนขยายของกฎธรรมชาติกับสถานการณ์ของชีวิตในสังคม และดังนั้น จึงเกี่ยวข้องกับมนุษย์เป็นสิ่งมีชีวิตทางสังคม (เช่น เป็นพลเมือง หรือ เป็นสมาชิกของครอบครัว) 'กฎหมายบวก' คือ ระบบของกฎและระเบียบที่เกี่ยวข้องกับใบสั่งทั่วไปในสังคมโดยเฉพาะมั่นใจ มันแตกต่างกันไป ตามขั้นตอนของการพัฒนาทางสังคม หรือเศรษฐกิจภายในชุมชนนั้น และ ตามกิจกรรมเฉพาะบุคคลภายใน ใช่กฎหมายบวกหรือ droit des gens นั้น อย่างไรก็ตาม deducible จากกฎหมายธรรมชาติเพียงอย่างเดียว ไม่เป็นที่รู้จักกัน connaturally และ ดังนั้น ไม่ใช่ส่วนหนึ่งของกฎหมายธรรมชาติ อย่างไรก็ตาม เป็น in virtue of ความสัมพันธ์กับกฎธรรมชาติที่ว่า "มีการบังคับของกฎหมาย และกำหนดตัวเองในจิตสำนึก" (เลส droits de l'homme นำ 90 - 1) เมื่อกฎหมายบวกทำหน้าที่ผิดกฎหมายธรรมชาติ ไม่ พัฒน กฎหมาย ดังนั้น Maritain ชัดเจนปฏิเสธกฎหมาย positivismThe term ‘natural law’ and its relations both to ‘eternal law’ and to positive law have, however, been the focus of much controversy. Maritain's account of natural law both presupposes a metaphysical view of the nature of human beings and a realistic epistemology, and has a number of tensions or inconsistencies internal to it. Some of the principal criticisms of this account are i) that it is inconsistent because it sets forth a naturalistic theory of what is good and bad and yet claims that only a supernatural sanction will serve to explain moral obligation, ii) that connatural knowledge is not only inadequate for what we normally count as knowledge, but it is, in fact, also incapable of establishing that something is a natural moral law, iii) that the first principle of moral law is vacuous, and iv) that Maritain glosses over the fact/value distinction.Maritain held that natural law theory entailed an account of human rights. Since the natural end of each person is to achieve moral and spiritual perfection, it is necessary to have the means to do so, i.e., to have rights which, since they serve to realise his or her nature, are called ‘natural’. This respects the Aristotelian-Thomistic principle of justice, that we should distribute to each ‘what is truly his or hers’. Maritain replies to the criticism that there are no such rights, since they are not universally recognised, by reminding his readers that, just as the natural law comes to be recognised gradually and over time, so also is there a gradual recognition of rights. Indeed, Maritain held that certain basic natural rights can be recognised by all, without there having to be agreement on their foundation and, as an illustration of this, he pointed to the general agreement on those rights found in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.Maritain held that natural rights are fundamental and inalienable, and antecedent in nature, and superior, to society. Still, they should not be understood as ‘antecedent’ in a temporal sense and do not form the basis of the state or of the civil law. Rights are grounded in the natural law, and specifically in relation to the common good. It is this good, and not individual rights, that is the basis of the state, and it is because of this that Maritain held that there can be a hierarchical ordering of these rights (Man and the State, p. 106-7).One consequence of his natural law and natural rights theory is that Maritain favoured a democratic and liberal view of the state, and argued for a political society that is both personalist, pluralist, and Christianly-inspired. He held that the authority to rule derives from the people — for people have a natural right to govern themselves. Still, this is consistent with a commitment to Christianity, Maritain thought, because the ideals of democracy are themselves inspired by a belief in God's rule, and that the primary source of all authority is God (Man and the State, p, 127).Maritain also favoured a number of liberal ideals, and the list of rights that he recognises extends significantly beyond that found in many liberal theories, and includes the rights of workers as well as those of the human and the civic person.Furthermore, the ideal of freedom or liberty to be found in the state is close to that which is now generally called ‘positive freedom’ — i.e., one that reflects a view of the person as sharing in a common good. As a polity that attempts to provide the conditions for the realisation of the human person as an individual who is, thereby, a member of a temporal community, it recognises that the use of goods by individuals must serve the good of all (Integral Humanism, p. 184), and that individuals can be required to serve the community. Moreover, in such a state political leaders would be more than just spokespersons for the people (Man and the State, p. 140), and Maritain recognises that they can represent the ‘hidden will’ of the people. Their aim — and the aim of the state as a whole — is, however, always the common good. Since minorities may themselves reflect this ‘hidden will,’ Maritain also recognised the important role to be played by dissenting minorities.(Maritain does not discuss in any detail how his model ‘Christian’ polity might be realised, but suggests that it is the only one that takes account of each person's spiritual worth and that recognises the importance of providing the means to foster one's growth as a person. It recognises differences of religious conscience and is, in this way, fundamentally pluralistic.)In such an ideal polity, Maritain imagines that a leadership role would be played by a multiplicity of ‘civic fraternities,’ founded on freedom, inspired by the virtues of Christianity, reflecting a moral and spiritual discipline, and which are fundamentally democratic. While such groups would not necessarily exercise political power, the society as a whole would reflect Christian values — not just because these values are part of a privileged religion or faith (a matter that Maritain would be wary of), but because these are necessary to the temporal community. In such a polity one would, of course, find a church and a state, though Maritain would see them as cooperative entities, with the state occupying itself with those matters that, while focusing on temporal concerns, addressed the needs of the whole of the human person, and with the church focussing on spiritual matters.It is, perhaps, evident that such a polity could not survive within a single nation state that existed among a plurality of states with different ideals, and so Maritain supported the ideal of a world federation of political societies. While the realisation of such an ideal was something that lay in a distant future, Maritain nevertheless thought that such a federation was possible, providing that the individual states retained a fair degree of autonomy and that persons could be found from each state who would voluntarily distance themselves from the particular interests of their home country.
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