Most existing studies do not consider voluntary disclosures of firms in conjunction
with their mandatory disclosures. This paper studies the interaction
MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES 613
between firms’ mandatory and voluntary disclosures, demonstrating the key
role that firms’ mandatory disclosures play in determining their voluntary
disclosure policies. By analyzing how various features of the disclosure regulation
affect firms’ incentives for making voluntary disclosures, this paper
provides accounting policymakers with useful knowledge for designing disclosure
rules in light of their overall impact on the level of disclosure in the
According to Proposition 9, when the aggregative signal is decomposed
into two portions, S1 and S2, of different qualities, disaggregated data are
voluntarily disclosed in equilibrium if, and only if, the more informative portion
is sufficiently favorable relative to the other portion
Most existing studies do not consider voluntary disclosures of firms in conjunction
with their mandatory disclosures. This paper studies the interaction
MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES 613
between firms’ mandatory and voluntary disclosures, demonstrating the key
role that firms’ mandatory disclosures play in determining their voluntary
disclosure policies. By analyzing how various features of the disclosure regulation
affect firms’ incentives for making voluntary disclosures, this paper
provides accounting policymakers with useful knowledge for designing disclosure
rules in light of their overall impact on the level of disclosure in the
According to Proposition 9, when the aggregative signal is decomposed
into two portions, S1 and S2, of different qualities, disaggregated data are
voluntarily disclosed in equilibrium if, and only if, the more informative portion
is sufficiently favorable relative to the other portion
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