5. Conclusion
Hikaka and Prebble’s application of autopoietic theory to tax law is helpful to rethink the value of Luhmann’s central
concept: autonomy. In this paper, however, we challenged the conclusion that autopoietic theory suffers from the consistency
problems invoked by the authors. We argued at length that their assertion based itself upon the common erroneous
interpretation of the legal system’s autonomy, as related to its capacity of not having its content affected by other systems.
Instead, I focused on the power of Luhmann’s concept of autonomy, concluding that it is well suited to re-tell the history of
the legal system vis-à-vis other social systems, but incapable of accounting for more micro legal phenomena both descriptive
and explanatorily. The value of autopoietic theory for tax law and accounting was said to rely on its power to identify which
is the crucial legal actor for tax law and accounting reform. Finally, we have shown how theorizing in tax law can be of
interest to think about public interest.
Extrapolating from the analysis of Hikaka and Prebble’s paper, I identified three main shortcomings that interdisciplinary
research in (tax) law must overcome: a deficient engagement with discipline-specific research questions and problems, a
lack of rigor in the translation of other disciplinary resources converting interdisciplinary research in a simple confirmatory
investigation, and the limited added value of interdisciplinary research due to insufficient comparison of its findings with
those of the established discipline.