DEAL OR NO DEAL
Of course, for Washington, Iran already presents quite a challenge, even without having to satisfy Saudi demands for American toughness. Iran has bedeviled American policymakers for decades, but U.S.-Iranian relations today are especially complicated because Tehran seems wracked, once again, by the perennial battle between hard-liners and pragmatists for the soul of the Islamic Republic. Both camps seek regional hegemony for Iran. The hard-liners think the best way to get it is to drive the United States from the region and replace the anti-Iranian and pro-American governments of the Middle East with ones more sympathetic to Tehran. Iran's quest for a nuclear weapons capability has been only one part of that strategy. Iran has also employed a wide range of other instruments to advance the hard-liners' agenda, including terrorism and support for revolutionaries and insurgents who threaten U.S. interests in the Middle East.
Iranian pragmatists, on the other hand, argue that Iran can achieve regional hegemony by developing its economy and human capital and by embracing the modern, globalized world. From their perspective, endlessly fighting the United States only weakens Iran; it would be better for Iran to grow into a dominant power peacefully, as Germany did after World War II.
A deal between Iran and the West that prevents the Islamic Republic from developing nuclear weapons might encourage Tehran to focus on its own economic growth and convince it to rein in its efforts to destabilize the region. But it is at least as likely that Iran would see a nuclear deal as relieving the pressure on its economy -- the regime's Achilles' heel -- and thus enabling it to redouble its aggressive foreign designs. The latter scenario is certainly what the Israelis, the Saudis, and many of Washington's other Middle Eastern allies dread. They fear that an arms control agreement will lead to a U.S.-Iranian détente that will leave them to face Iran's aggression on their own.
Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also worries about the potential effects of a nuclear deal, although for different reasons. He has long agonized over the seductive influence of American culture and fears that a constructive relationship between the United States and Iran would subvert the theocratic state and taint Iran's revolutionary image in the Muslim world. He has found more value in leading the rejectionist pack than in joining the global order. Even if a nuclear deal emerged that interested him, he might feel that the only way to placate the hard-liners he relies on would be to assure them that the agreement would not otherwise moderate Iranian foreign policy. He might even try to secure their grudging acceptance of such a deal by promising them a freer hand to make mischief abroad.
Consequently, it seems premature to assume that a nuclear accord with Iran will mean the end of Iranian regional aggression. But the history of the region strongly suggests that the United States is the state best able to limit Iran's aggressive efforts to overturn the regional status quo. Claims of Iranian irrationality notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic has always demonstrated an unmistakable respect for American power. The Iranians are generally careful not to cross explicit American redlines. They sometimes challenge and probe U.S. prohibitions, but when they meet resistance, they usually step back, fearful of how Washington might react. Iran, for example, has never kicked out the UN inspectors who monitor its nuclear program, and it has never shipped its most lethal weapons to Iraqi Shiite militias or Hezbollah. There are a small number of exceptions to this pattern, but they have typically proved the rule: the Iranians have crossed American redlines only when they have misjudged their exact position or perceived correctly that they were not truly red.
Tehran has no such respect for its regional adversaries, whom the Iranians regard with contempt. The feelings are mutual, and thus without the United States there to deter Iran and intercede on behalf of U.S. allies, there is a high probability of regional crises that could escalate in unpredictable ways and threaten American interests, especially the price of oil.
The challenge for the United States, then, is to find a way to negotiate an end to Iran's nuclear ambitions while restraining Tehran's regional ambitions. To find the right mix of détente and containment, Washington must restore its allies' confidence in its willingness and ability to protect their security. The interim nuclear agreement with Iran has fueled concerns in Arab capitals and Israel that arms control diplomacy might bring Iran and the United States into a regional embrace. That prospect might seem comical given the legacy of mistrust between Washington and Tehran, but it is taken all too seriously in Arab royal palaces and chancelleries, and in Tel Aviv. Perhaps the best way to shore up U.S. allies' faith in Wash