Executive compensation has become a focus of growing social inequity since the 2007-
2008 financial crisis. The ratio of CEO to average worker compensation in 2012 was over
270-to-1 and more than nine times its 1978 level. Ineffective regulations and excessive
risk-taking motivated by misaligned incentives have been blamed for the financial crisis.
The public scrutiny of executive compensation has organizations attempting to legitimize
executive compensation contracts. The purpose of this quantitative, longitudinal,
correlational study was to examine the extent of CEO incentive compensation
homogenization between and within large US food and chemical manufacturers over a
five-year period (2008-2012). The results of this study indicate a correlation between
research intensity level and the percent of total compensation paid as equity-based
incentive only at the highest research intensity level. No significant correlations were
found between the lowest and middle research intensity levels for equity-based incentives,
and no significant correlations were found between research intensity and cash incentives.
The findings of this study indicated significantly homogenized compensation structures
across industries that could reflect isomorphism. Examination of more industries would
expand the understanding of the level of homogenized compensation structures. Ex post
facto examination of tax law changes and compensation allocations will help government
officials devise regulations regarding compensation and incentives that maximize profits,
limit risk seeking, and are socially equitable.