by reducing capital accumulation and productivity growth, is negatively correlated
with economic growth.
The IMF economists Mohsin Khan and Abdelhak Senhadji (2001:1–21) find a
threshold level of 11–12 percent, above which inflation is negatively correlated with
growth. But the economists were not able to determine the direction of causality.
Since the early 1990s, macroeconomic policies and performance in LDCs have
improved markedly. Inflation has been more stable than previously (see Table 14-4
for evidence concerning reduced inflation since the early 1990s). The international
economy has been less volatile and central bankers and monetary policy makers
have improved tools and knowledge for stabilizing output and prices. Moreover, a
reduction in direct state ownership of banks and the introduction of explicit deposit
insurance have improved the effectiveness of monetary policy in stabilizing the macroeconomy
(Cecchetti and Krause 2001).
This improved proficiency is reflected in studies examining LDCs’ control of inflation.
Michael Bruno and William Easterly’s (1998:3–24) study for the World Bank
shows no negative correlation between inflation and economic growth for inflation
rates under 40 percent annually; the negative relationship between inflation and
growth holds only for high-inflationary economies. Based on this, the World Bank
Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz (1998:8) argues, in his U.N. University/World Institute
for Development Economics Research lecture, that below this level, “there is
little evidence that inflation is costly” [his italics]. Indeed, Stiglitz (1988:4; 2002a:27,
45, 107) indicates that the preoccupation of the IMF, along with U.S. economic
officials, with contractionary monetary and fiscal policies (increased interest rates
and reduced taxes and government spending) exacerbated the downturn during the
East Asian 1997–99 crisis, stifling growth and spreading the downturn to neighboring
countries. Moreover, the IMF contributed to financial instability by urging
reduced financial regulation when inadequate financial-sector supervision and monitoring
was a more serious problem among developing countries (Stiglitz 2002a:81).
Christopher Cramer and John Weeks (2002:43–61) contend that the focus of IMF
macroeconomic stabilization programs, often draconian monetary measures, the conditions
for lending of last resort to LDCs, is usually unnecessary and harmful. Reviving
growth should generally take precedence over monetary and fiscal orthodoxy. In
1995, more than half the LDCs had inflation rates of less than 15 percent annually,
indicating to Stiglitz (1988:14) that for these countries, “controlling inflation should
not be an overarching priority.