First of all, the Uruguay Round (1987-1994), which replaced the GATT, did not
deliver any actual liberalization of GATS. Many WTO members locked in their specific
commitments at 50 percent, although their actual commitments were way below that
level[17]. Moreover, little progress has been made in extending that coverage since the
WTO came into existence in 1995. Many countries have their “bound” commitments
2.3 times more restrictive than currently applied policies, and thus can more than
double their average levels of restrictiveness without violating their commitments
(Borchet et al., 2010). Second, sectoral commitments varies widely – while uniformly
high commitments made for tourism and related services (almost 70 percent in both developed and developing countries), public services (such as education, health,
transport, postal and basic telecom) are subject to least commitments. Interestingly,
the most restrictive sectors, which are also potentially most beneficial, are FDI and
movement of individual service providers (Mode 4), and between these two, Mode 4
remains least open (Hoekman and Mattoo, 2011).
Third, liberalization of Mode 4 is also affected by other factors, such as:
. visa formalities, which is not part of international trade policy, but of
immigration legislation and labor market policy;
. prohibitions and quotas – the requirement of recruiting and retaining sufficient
national workers before filing work permit or visa application (the so-called
economic needs tests);
. wage-parity conditions – wages paid to foreign workers to be similar with wages
paid to national workers, which erodes the cost advantage of hiring foreign workers;
. discriminatory treatment, such as residency or citizenship requirements, social
security tax payments, preferences to domestic workers; and finally
. non-recognition of professional qualifications and burdensome licensing
requirements in host countries[18].
First of all, the Uruguay Round (1987-1994), which replaced the GATT, did notdeliver any actual liberalization of GATS. Many WTO members locked in their specificcommitments at 50 percent, although their actual commitments were way below thatlevel[17]. Moreover, little progress has been made in extending that coverage since theWTO came into existence in 1995. Many countries have their “bound” commitments2.3 times more restrictive than currently applied policies, and thus can more thandouble their average levels of restrictiveness without violating their commitments(Borchet et al., 2010). Second, sectoral commitments varies widely – while uniformlyhigh commitments made for tourism and related services (almost 70 percent in both developed and developing countries), public services (such as education, health,transport, postal and basic telecom) are subject to least commitments. Interestingly,the most restrictive sectors, which are also potentially most beneficial, are FDI andmovement of individual service providers (Mode 4), and between these two, Mode 4remains least open (Hoekman and Mattoo, 2011).Third, liberalization of Mode 4 is also affected by other factors, such as:. visa formalities, which is not part of international trade policy, but ofimmigration legislation and labor market policy;. prohibitions and quotas – the requirement of recruiting and retaining sufficientแรงงานแห่งชาติก่อนการยื่นงานอนุญาต หรือวีซ่า (เรียกว่าเศรษฐกิจต้องทดสอบ);. เงื่อนไขพาริตี้ค่าจ้างค่าจ้างที่จ่ายให้คล้ายกับค่าจ้างแรงงานต่างประเทศจ่ายให้แรงงานแห่งชาติ ซึ่งกัดกร่อนประโยชน์จากต้นทุนการจ้างแรงงานต่างประเทศ. รักษาโจ่งแจ้ง เช่นซี่หรือสัญชาติความ สังคมความปลอดภัยการชำระภาษี กำหนดลักษณะแรง และสุดท้าย. ไม่ใช่การจดจำของคุณสมบัติระดับมืออาชีพและการอนุญาตให้ใช้สิทธิ์ที่เป็นภาระความต้องการในประเทศ [18]
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..