- The Bank of England also found fault with the process of funding Leeson’s activities from London. First, there was no clear understanding of whether the funds were needed for clients or for Baring’s own accounts, making reconciliation impossible. Second, given the large amounts, credit checks should have been completed as well. The report places the responsibility for the lack of due diligence with Tony Hawes, Ian Hopkins, and the Chairman of the Barings Credit Committee.
- The issue of proper reconciliation arose as early as April 1992 when Gordon Bowser, the risk manager in London, recommended that a reconciliation process be developed. Unfortunately, Bowser left Simon Jones and Tony Dickel, who had sent Leeson to Singapore, to agree on a procedure. With internal conflict over who was responsible for Leeson’s activities, no agreement was reached between those two, and Leeson was left to establish reconciliation procedures for himself.
- There are numerous similar examples of internal conflict benefitting Leeson’s covert trading throughout the three years. But one of the late failures occurred in January 1995 when SIMEX raised concern over Barings’ ability to meet its large margins. In a letter dated January 11, 1995, and addressed to Simon Jones, SIMEX officials noted that there should have been an additional $100 million in the margin account for 88888. Jones passed the letter to Leeson to draft a response.
- External Reasons. In January 1995, SIMEX was getting close to Leeson’s activities, but had not yet managed to determine what was happening. In response to a second letter dated January 27, 1995 and sent to James Bax in Singapore, SIMEX expressed concerns regarding Barings’ ability to fund its margin calls. Bax referred the letter to London, and SIMEX received reassurance that opposite positions were held in Japan. Unfortunately, SIMEX officials did not follow up with the Osaka Stock Exchange to verify the existence of those positions.
- The Bank of England also found fault with the process of funding Leeson’s activities from London. First, there was no clear understanding of whether the funds were needed for clients or for Baring’s own accounts, making reconciliation impossible. Second, given the large amounts, credit checks should have been completed as well. The report places the responsibility for the lack of due diligence with Tony Hawes, Ian Hopkins, and the Chairman of the Barings Credit Committee.
- The issue of proper reconciliation arose as early as April 1992 when Gordon Bowser, the risk manager in London, recommended that a reconciliation process be developed. Unfortunately, Bowser left Simon Jones and Tony Dickel, who had sent Leeson to Singapore, to agree on a procedure. With internal conflict over who was responsible for Leeson’s activities, no agreement was reached between those two, and Leeson was left to establish reconciliation procedures for himself.
- There are numerous similar examples of internal conflict benefitting Leeson’s covert trading throughout the three years. But one of the late failures occurred in January 1995 when SIMEX raised concern over Barings’ ability to meet its large margins. In a letter dated January 11, 1995, and addressed to Simon Jones, SIMEX officials noted that there should have been an additional $100 million in the margin account for 88888. Jones passed the letter to Leeson to draft a response.
- External Reasons. In January 1995, SIMEX was getting close to Leeson’s activities, but had not yet managed to determine what was happening. In response to a second letter dated January 27, 1995 and sent to James Bax in Singapore, SIMEX expressed concerns regarding Barings’ ability to fund its margin calls. Bax referred the letter to London, and SIMEX received reassurance that opposite positions were held in Japan. Unfortunately, SIMEX officials did not follow up with the Osaka Stock Exchange to verify the existence of those positions.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..