Noted criminologist K Chockalingam has been conferred with the Paul H Appleby Award for his distinguished services to public administration.
The prestigious award was conferred by Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA) to honour Chockalingam, who has served as professor and researcher in criminology in University of Madras and is Vice President of World Society of Victimology.
He also worked as Chair Professor of criminal law at the National Law University (NLU) in Delhi from 2012-14.
According to IIPA, of which he was a member, Chockalingam was honoured for his services to the institute and to the field of public administration.
He has also authored four books and more than 75 research papers and won many awards including Senior Social Scientist Award of Indian Society of Criminology 1994 and Distinguished International Scholar Award of American Society of Criminology, 1996.
He is also the founder and president of Indian Society of Victimology since 1992 and International Advisor of Tokiwa International Victimology Institute, Japan since 2003.
The award by IIPA is a tribute to Paul Appleby, a noted author of works in the field of public administration who helped in developing the vision of the institute in the early years of its founding.
The administrative state is the nexus of American policy making in the postwar period. The vague and sometimes conflicting policy mandates of Congress, the president, and courts are translated into real public policy in the bureaucracy. As the role of the national government has expanded, the national legislature and executive have increasingly delegated authority to administrative agencies to make fundamental policy decisions. How this administrative state is designed, its coherence, its responsiveness, and its efficacy determine, in Robert Dahl's phrase, "who gets what, when, and how." This study of agency design, thus, has implications for the study of politics in many areas. The structure of bureaucracies can determine the degree to which political actors can change the direction of agency policy. Politicians frequently attempt to lock their policy preferences into place through insulating structures that are mandated by statute or executive decree. This insulation of public bureaucracies, such as the Social Security Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Internal Revenue Service, is essential to understanding both administrative policy outputs and executive-legislative politics in the United States. This book explains why, when, and how political actors create administrative agencies in such a way as to insulate them from political control, particularly presidential control.
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