for less mobile production factors (e.g. land values), raising production costs for
new producers and therefore demand for the continuation of the programs;
· they have a negative effect on the development of alternative sources of agricultural
credit (such as credit from up- and downstream industries), because those alternative
sources face uneven competition from the subsidised credits;
· they tend to give the wrong signals to the reforming enterprises. Economic
adjustments that eventually will have to be made might be postponed, making their
implementation later on even more difficult. For example, if preferential credit is
given to structures that are to be reformed and restructured, they might reduce the
incentives for those organisations to proceed with the reforms, and thereby have an
adverse impact on the reform process2
;
· as credit is fungible, credit intended for agriculture may flow to other, more
profitable activities3
;
· unless the problem of collateral is addressed as well, credit subsidies will have little
effect on the rationing problem. For example: the 1992 credit subsidy program in
Bulgaria had little effect as the banks continued to refuse to lend to agriculture,
because they could not obtain sufficient collateral. Then, the government obliged
the banks to accept future crop output (backed by crop insurance) as a collateral. In
case of default the law specified the sharing of collateral risk between banks and
government. When the banks were still reluctant, the government included a
regulation that would penalise bank managers for obstructing loans to agriculture;
· Dependent upon the allocation procedure employed, credit subsidies might induce
(opportunities for) corruption.
for less mobile production factors (e.g. land values), raising production costs fornew producers and therefore demand for the continuation of the programs;· they have a negative effect on the development of alternative sources of agriculturalcredit (such as credit from up- and downstream industries), because those alternativesources face uneven competition from the subsidised credits;· they tend to give the wrong signals to the reforming enterprises. Economicadjustments that eventually will have to be made might be postponed, making theirimplementation later on even more difficult. For example, if preferential credit isgiven to structures that are to be reformed and restructured, they might reduce theincentives for those organisations to proceed with the reforms, and thereby have anadverse impact on the reform process2;· as credit is fungible, credit intended for agriculture may flow to other, moreprofitable activities3;· unless the problem of collateral is addressed as well, credit subsidies will have littleeffect on the rationing problem. For example: the 1992 credit subsidy program inBulgaria had little effect as the banks continued to refuse to lend to agriculture,because they could not obtain sufficient collateral. Then, the government obligedthe banks to accept future crop output (backed by crop insurance) as a collateral. Incase of default the law specified the sharing of collateral risk between banks andgovernment. When the banks were still reluctant, the government included a
regulation that would penalise bank managers for obstructing loans to agriculture;
· Dependent upon the allocation procedure employed, credit subsidies might induce
(opportunities for) corruption.
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