Of the three monetary systems considered here, the classical gold standard is
the most difficult to analyze in terms of the dynamics of hegemonic decline. It
might be argued that the pound was overvalued for at least a decade before
1913 and that Britain’s failure to devalue resulted in sluggish growth, which
accelerated the economy’s hegemonic decline. The competitive difficulties of
older British industries, notably iron and steel, and the decelerating rate of
economic growth in the first decade of the twentieth century are consistent with
this view. The deceleration in the rate of British economic growth has been
ascribed to both a decline in productivity growth and a fall in the rate of domestic
capital formation. This fall in the rate of domestic capital formation, especially
after 1900, reflected, not a decline in British savings rates, but a surge of foreign
investment. Thus, if Britain’s hegemonic position in the international economy
is to have caused its relative decline, this hegemony would have had to be
responsible for the country’s exceptionally high propensity to export capital.
The volume of British capital exports in the decades preceding World War I has
been attributed, alternatively, to the spread of industrialization and associated
investment opportunities to other countries and continents and to imperfections
in the structure of British capital markets that resulted in a bias toward investment
overseas. It is impossible to resolve this debate here. But the version of the
market imperfections argument that attributes the London capital market’s lack
of interest in domestic investment to Britain’s relatively early and labor-intensive
form of industrialization implies that the same factors responsible for Britain’s
mid-nineteenth-century hegemony (the industrial revolution occurred there first)
may also have been responsible for the capital market biases that accelerated its
hegemonic decline.
Of the three monetary systems considered here, the classical gold standard isthe most difficult to analyze in terms of the dynamics of hegemonic decline. Itmight be argued that the pound was overvalued for at least a decade before1913 and that Britain’s failure to devalue resulted in sluggish growth, whichaccelerated the economy’s hegemonic decline. The competitive difficulties ofolder British industries, notably iron and steel, and the decelerating rate ofeconomic growth in the first decade of the twentieth century are consistent withthis view. The deceleration in the rate of British economic growth has beenascribed to both a decline in productivity growth and a fall in the rate of domesticcapital formation. This fall in the rate of domestic capital formation, especiallyafter 1900, reflected, not a decline in British savings rates, but a surge of foreigninvestment. Thus, if Britain’s hegemonic position in the international economyis to have caused its relative decline, this hegemony would have had to beresponsible for the country’s exceptionally high propensity to export capital.The volume of British capital exports in the decades preceding World War I hasbeen attributed, alternatively, to the spread of industrialization and associatedinvestment opportunities to other countries and continents and to imperfectionsin the structure of British capital markets that resulted in a bias toward investmentoverseas. It is impossible to resolve this debate here. But the version of themarket imperfections argument that attributes the London capital market’s lackof interest in domestic investment to Britain’s relatively early and labor-intensiveform of industrialization implies that the same factors responsible for Britain’smid-nineteenth-century hegemony (the industrial revolution occurred there first)may also have been responsible for the capital market biases that accelerated itshegemonic decline.
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