It soon became obvious to IBM’s competitors that a more fundamental
response to Systelni'36t'J was required. Most of the competition introduced
one or more families of computers such that, at least in theory, customers
who started by purchasing a model at the bottom of the range would be
able to migrate upward within the range without having to rewrite all of
their computer programs. Most of these computer families were
incompatible with Systemr’360—RCA’s Spectra ?‘0 was the exception. A
few companies also attempted niche strategies, focusing on those
segments of the market where 5ystem,"3EO was absent or weak. Table 4.2
presents the competitive responses to Systemr’36U (and then to its
successor, Systemr’3?0) in the American market, highlighting the three
strategies described.
The table shows the extent to which RCA was unique among lBM‘s
competitors: it delivered a range of computers, the Spectra 70, such that
customers starting at the bottom ol the System-F360 range would be able to
migrate to one of the IBM-compatible Spectra TF0 machines. Of course,
migration could potentially take place from RCA to IBM as well, and
RCA was perfectly aware of this fact. It expected, however, that it would
be able to gain many more customers than it would lose to IBM.
RCA announced its Spectra ?U fan1ily—lD models in total—in
December 1964. The company positioned each of its machines between a
pair of Systen1r'36U models, with the RCA computer performing better
than the less powerful IBM model. For example, RCA placed the Spectra
70 Model 45 between Systen1r360 Model 40 and 5ysten1J360 Model 50,
with the goal of beating at least the 360 Model 40 in price-performance.