and binds together vertical networks of bosses and subordinates share the tasks of collecting and redistributing the revenue The values of group loyalty and hierarchy which underlie this subculture are first nurtured in the police cadet school. They are further reinforced at work by the examples of other police officers and by the pressure from superiors and peers involved in the corruption networks. Not all policemen are involved in these networks. But the proportion which is corrupt is large enough to maintain the syndicate system. The government has had little will to undermine this system The government does not want to create discontent in the police force, and does not want to have to pay much more money to maintain it. Further, public pressure to contain police corruption has been weak and intermittent. The practice of position-buying is facilitated by the systems of promotion and transfer. Indeed the systems of promotion and transfer may have evolved to facilitate position-buying. Senior postings are effectively decided by the police director alone. At of the hierarchy, superiors have similar absolute ower leve power, subject only to the counter-signature of those above them in the hierarchy. The system contains few checks and balances, and is inevitably suborned by the vertical corruption networks which characterize the police department. The corruption syndicates within the police have been allowed to develop for four major reasons. First, the revenue of these syndicates is widely distributed not only among people in the police department, but also to other officials in the military, in the Ministry of Interior and in the juridical process of law enforcement Second, the system has been operative for a long period of time and had become embedded within a subculture which pervaded the police department. The police thus operates almost like 'a state within the state', which even the minister of interior and the prime minister find difficult to control Third, in the past the police had been used to serve private interests by higher bureaucrats and politicians in the name of national securit The government itself neglected to provide adequate funds for its development. This forced the police to find official their own means Over proliferation of corruption funding became another reason for the practices no government with strong enough Fourth, there has been within t will to deal properly with the corruption syndicates s beyond our task to venture to offer prescriptions for controlling police corruption. Numerous committees, chaired even by deputy prime ministers, have been set up and charged with the task of finding ways to restructure and reform the police department. Useful recommendations have been made but never adopted. Generally they were rejected by the police department, often on ground of bad timing and unsuitability due to 'national security reasons' 3 The proponents of reform have been unable to overcome the entrenched power of the police hierarchy In closing we would like to suggest three main issues for consideration relevant to the reform of the police. First, there is a popular belief among bureaucrats both inside and outside the police that the police problem is easy to solve if only we can recruit good' men with high moral principles then there will be no corrupt policemen. According to this view there is no need to restructure or reform the system of promotion and transfers; nor to decentralize the highly centralized structure of command within the police. This view emphasizes manpower development. This is an important aspect, but the reform of the structure and the system is also crucial. Even prime minis Chuan Leekpai said that there is a need to restructure and reform the system. A good person working within a bad system ca easily suborned, because the temptation for lucrative gain i great. The power structure of the police must be decentralized possibly along the lines adopted in Japan. Second, the government through the prime minister must have a strong will to reform the police system. And the government must be able to guarantee safety to the people who make a stand against police wrong-doing. For instance, if the people are to stop paying bribes to the police, the government must come out to say so and help protect the people again reprisals from the police.Third, a beginning could be made by setting up an independent body having the power to oversee the work of the police and impose serious punishment for wrongdoing. The model may be the clean-up of the corruption syndicates in the Hong Kong police in 1977 Finally, it is important to stress again that the police is not different from other department of government. The historical pressures shaping the internal subculture of corruption in the police have had a similar impact on many other departments. Corruption in the police is especially noticeable because so many people come into contact with it in the course of their everyday In survey of popular opinion, the police department was rated as the most corrupt department of government. Corruption in the police a so has a special significance. encourages crime. It ensures that those who run illegal businesses and criminal activities can buy protection and make super-profits leads to of both society and politics since of who achieve wealth and power have risen the profits of criminal activi The appearance of suspected drug and confessed big-time gamblers among of MPs is the result of police corruptibility, and has an the image and the functioning of impact key pillar is the rule of the law institutions. justice for all before the law. With a and the opportunity of is more like the rule of money and corrupt we have justice for the benefit of the few the ortunity of perverting opport