Conclusions
Perhaps we may conclude by acknowledging that moral values are values that may be
derived from wider elements, and that moral choices are such that they should be
expressed in principles that transcend special times, place, or special pleading. There is,
in other words, an expressed need for consistency of approach. What this article aims to
show is that the debate, still alive and well, needs to extend to include contemporary
issues. As to the matter of which moral view is held the present writers are inclined to the
view that a raised awareness of the issue, and its application to real life situations, is
critical. Intentions remain invisible, and consequences invested with unknown motives.
The basis of this conclusion is that morals must operate in a real world, and that clearly
implies desirable outcomes: the second reason is that good intent is recognised as
powerful – but does not do as much to foster moral behaviour as does an orientation to
outcome. The discussed issues would certainly benefit from further speculation.
The illustrations given above are designed to capture the essence of concern. The
main intended contribution of this paper is to add some further considerations to that
debate. This paper noted the basic dilemma of moral choice, action or intent: it also
adds to the debate by a consideration of several lesser points, including the value of
apologies as a preventative, being both an action and an expression of intent; the two
meanings of “outcome”, the idea that one may propose an ethical principle without
violating the naturalistic fallacy (deriving a moral principle from a non-moral
proposition), and the awareness that morals refer to an underpinning value choice.
A major argument is that the distinction between intent and consequences is a
fallacious one. While both operate there is the view that the approach does not force us
to choose between them. As to the dilemma of choosing the well-intentioned bumbler
from the moral prudent calculator one needs to consider the underlying factors that
impel both. Finally, the concept of paradoxical intent is a factor that may be critical to
an understanding of seeming moral dilemmas. In making moral decisions in any
context it is incumbent upon the decider to be assured that the categorical imperative
parameters are really respected, or the consequences will really follow, and not some
substantive inversion. The paradoxical nature of moral decision making is endemic in
many circumstances, and is something to be strongly borne in mind.