To this argument, Buchanan and Wagner’s (1977, 1978) public choice
riposte runs as follows. Keynes was an economist who saw his role as being
one of acquiring knowledge and offering advice to a small group of enlightened
politicians who could be trusted to do the ‘right thing’. Keynes did not stop
to consider the application of his policy prescriptions to a democratic
society in which parties fight to gain and retain elected office. At times of
impending recession, vote-maximizing politicians will increase expenditure
and cut taxation because it will be in their self-interest to do so. Politicians
know that voters prefer high public expenditure to low public expenditure
and low taxation to high taxation and that raising the former and reducing
the latter will therefore increase their chances of being re-elected. But they
have no corresponding incentive to cut expenditure and increase tax during
periods of economic boom. To put the matter crudely, politicians are no
more likely to raise taxes in the run-up to an election than turkeys are to
vote for Christmas. This asymmetry in incentives means that, over time,
public expenditure, taxes and borrowing deficits will all rise. This will,
eventually, result in either slower economic growth or recession and higher