Background
The concept of power remains elusive both conceptually and empirically
(Hyden 2008). Foucault (1994) called power the ‘most hidden’
part of human relations and the very concept may be ‘essentially contested’,
meaning the subjective assumptions needed to analyse it are
inherently value-dependent (Gallie 1955–6). Stephen Lukes (2004a)
suggests the term itself is ‘polysemic’ and can be defined to include or
exclude a range of phenomena such as authority, influence, coercion,
force, manipulation and domination. And while many analyses of
power cite Robert Dahl’s (1961) classic definition, ‘A has power over
B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not
otherwise do’, others argue this formulation captures only overt, compulsory
forms of power, ignoring more subtle phenomena such as
those encompassed by Bertrand Russell’s (1938) power of ‘propaganda
or habit’ or Gramsciian ‘hegemonic ideas’ operating unnoticed
in the background (Gramsci 2012).
Power is fundamental if mysterious force in health policy as in
all human endeavours and in recent years scholars have called for
empirical studies of power in health policy to advance understanding
and ultimately ‘tackle the global political determinants of health’
(Buse et al. 2009a; Marten et al. 2014). We began from a largely agnostic
position on the dimensions of power most relevant to health
policymaking processes, considering theories encompassing both the
sources of power (e.g. in personal charisma, procedural raison,
physical force) and the mechanisms by which it is exercised in society
(Russell 1938; Weber 1948; Giddens 1984; Foucault 2002;
Lukes 2004b). Given the theoretical cornucopia at our disposal—
and early stage of the health policy literature in tackling this topic—
we decided to focus on dimensions of power most relevant to the
Nigerien case, as revealed by preliminary data analysis. Other forms
of power, such as those based on personal characteristics or physical
or military force, while excluded from this analysis, may be of
greater relevance to other studies and contexts, but did not appear
Key Messages
• Research on health policy, particularly in low-and middle-income countries, has rarely focused on questions of power as
they impact policy decisions.
• We offer a policy analysis of integrated community case management of childhood illness (iCCM) in Niger based on the
three dimensions of power: political authority, financial resources and technical expertise.
• We find that power dynamics embedded in governance structures and political economy features of the Nigerien state
were decisive in key policy decisions and helped motivate a pro-poor agenda; well-timed injections of external funds
and the combination of international agencies’ scientific expertise and Ministry officials’ operational know-how were
also pivotal.
• International agencies and policy actors often fail to sufficiently understand local power structures, thereby passing up
opportunities to successfully promote pro-poor policies.
Health Policy and Planning, 2015, Vol. 30, Supplement 2 ii85
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to be of primary importance in the Nigerien case. The three dimensions
of power that emerged as most salient and are discussed here
are (1) political authority, (2) financial resources and (3) technical
expertise.
The first dimension of power, political authority, can influence
policy development processes in both direct and indirect ways.
Indeed, policy reform is a ‘profoundly political’ process as it explicitly
decides who in society receives valued goods in society (Reich
1995). Possessors of political authority (e.g. presidents and prime
ministers but also lower-level political officials) can directly advance
or hinder specific health policies by drawing attention to issues, controlling
financial resources and regulatory regimes and selecting
health policy actors and applying pressure on them (Croke 2012;
Shiffman and Garce´s del Valle 2006); furthermore, political cycles
and incentives can be exploited by policymakers to improve the
chances of policy reforms (Reich 1995). Holders of political authority
can also have indirect impacts on policymaking, e.g. by creating
institutional incentives and constraints or setting up trade-offs with
competing priorities. Furthermore, less overt sources of power such
as political legitimacy can provide leeway to actors possessing it or
motivate policy decision-making.
The second dimension of power, financial resources, is in some
way the simplest: funding is the sine qua non of the policy enterprise,
especially at the level of implementation. Beyond the mere
availability of financial resources for the policy in question, however,
it is relevant to consider who possesses or controls these financial
resources, as these actors have inherently greater advantages in
the political (and policy) arenas (Wright Mills 1968; Buse et al.
2009b). In the arena of health policy, actors exercising financial
power at the national level include politicians exercising control
over state budgets or international donors in the position to offer
funds for the health or other sectors. Financial resources are thus inseparably
linked to the power of political authority, in that revenue
flows (stemming from sources both internal and external to the
state) bestow power on actors, who choose where to allocate funds
among various policy options. Actors may also support the spread
of policies through the ‘manipulation of economic costs and benefits’
of choices, as has been observed in the international policy diffusion
literature (Dobbin et al. 2007).
Third, technical expertise is intrinsic to government action in the
modern era, and control over knowledge and information is a crucial
dimension of power in policymaking (Haas 1992; Rose and
Miller 1992). Technical capacity to produce, interpret and disseminate
knowledge and information is differentially distributed among
actors within the policy sphere, particularly in LMICs, where
powerful international actors often proliferate (Pallas et al. 2015).
The type of actors exercising technical power depends on who possesses
the training that confers these capacities (and the diplomas to
prove it), but would typically include technical officers in ministries
and international organizations. Actors’ technical education and
training not only condition the epistemic and normative frameworks
guiding their practice but also confer power in and of themselves: in
global health, Shiffman (2014) finds that holders of expertise claim
authority based on a privileged relationship to the truth and a superior
procedural way of moving towards the ideal policy outcome. At
lower levels, actors can also exercise technical power via regulatory
and operational decision making (Lipsky 1980; Erasmus and Gilson
2008; Lehmann and Gilson 2012). Finally, since Foucault (1994),
we understand knowledge itself to be the product of power relations
in the society that created it, meaning the way problems are presented
and the scientific or technical arguments used to support policy
positions must be reflected upon critically.
Across all these dimensions, incentives and constraints affect the
choices made by those in possession of power, as power is ‘a dispositional
concept, comprising a conjunction of conditional or hypothetical
statements specifying what would occur under a range of
circumstances if and when the power is exercised’ (emphasis added)
(Lukes 2004a). This ability to act or not act in favour of a policy (or
anything else) is what Bachrach and Baratz (1970) call the ‘two faces
of power’. Indeed, all three dimensions of power identified here can
be exercised according both active and passive mechanisms: endowing
funds, or withholding political support, making scientific or
technical arguments in favour of a policy, or remaining conspicuously
silent. In our study of the Nigerien case, we will seek both
positive and negative examples of the use of power.