Nevertheless, Roscher opines that inductive methods are applicable in the social sciences, History provides a basis for making repeated observations and by coming the historical development of nations, of institutions and of other holistic entities, social laws and laws of historical development can be induced(Milford 1995).
Menger criticizes Roscher's position of methodological inductivist essentialism with different arguments. By organizing the Grundsatze according to the requirements of methodological individualism, he rejects that position by way of his general analysis. This is shown by the chapter sequence of that book. In order to solve exchange and relative prices as an unintended outcome of the interplay of individual intended actions, Menger starts his analysis by explaining individual intended actions, In the first three chapters, he provides a relational theory of the evaluating behaviour of individuals analyzing their behaviour under different conditions. The first chapter "The General Theory of the Good scrutinizes the conditions that must exist in order that individuals evaluate objects and actions as goods and services. In the second chapter "Economy and Economic Goods", he proceeds by showing that observations such as the scarcity of goods basically result from the preferences and from the evaluating behaviour of humans under different conditions. In the third chapter "The Theory of value", Menger provides a more precise explanation of the standards and the processes according to which individuals evaluate objects (actions) as goods (services). This theory provides the basis for explaining exchange and relative prices. Chap, 4, "The Theory of Exchange" explains exchange and Chap. 5"the Theory of Price" proceeds by explaining prices as an unintended result of the interplay of individual intended actions. Chapters 6 and 7 are degressions and clarifications; but Chap. 8 provides another example of explaining institutions along the lines of methodological individuals, i.e. money. But apart from organizing the Grandsarze along methodological principles which are incompatible with methodological inductivist essentialism, Menger also indicates that this position is based on a misunderstanding with respect to the application of inductive methods in the social sciences. Obviously having methodological inductivist essentialism in mind be writes that
past attempts to camy over the peculiarities of the natural scientific method of investigation uncritically into economics have led to most senoun methodological error, and to idle play with external analogies between the phenomena of ecnnomics and those of natum. (Menger 1981, p 47)
and he proceeds explaining that authors defending such positions although calling “…themselves disciples of Bacon….. completely misunderstand the spirit of his method" Menger 1981, p. 47).
Due to his primary aim of developing a satisfactory price theory. Menger refrains from providing a more elaborate critique of this version of essentialism in the Grundsatze. However, in the Untersuchungen, he launches a devastating attack on Gnundsatze, However, methodological inductivist essentialism. There he shows that this position rests on rather naive views with respect to inductive methods and that they have to be rejected on logical and epistemological grounds. His first objection refers to the so called argument of the transcendence of first order. According to him, methodological inductivist essentialism attempts to avoid abstraction from a given empirical basis.
อย่างไรก็ตาม Roscher ไปว่า วิธีเชิงอุปนัยจะใช้ในสังคมวิทยา ประวัติแสดงข้อมูลพื้นฐาน สำหรับการทำการสังเกตซ้ำ และมาพัฒนาทางประวัติศาสตร์ ของประชาชาติ สถาบัน และอื่น ๆ เอนทิตีแบบองค์รวม กฎหมายสังคม และกฎหมายของการพัฒนาทางประวัติศาสตร์สามารถทำให้เกิด (ดพา 1995)Menger criticizes Roscher's position of methodological inductivist essentialism with different arguments. By organizing the Grundsatze according to the requirements of methodological individualism, he rejects that position by way of his general analysis. This is shown by the chapter sequence of that book. In order to solve exchange and relative prices as an unintended outcome of the interplay of individual intended actions, Menger starts his analysis by explaining individual intended actions, In the first three chapters, he provides a relational theory of the evaluating behaviour of individuals analyzing their behaviour under different conditions. The first chapter "The General Theory of the Good scrutinizes the conditions that must exist in order that individuals evaluate objects and actions as goods and services. In the second chapter "Economy and Economic Goods", he proceeds by showing that observations such as the scarcity of goods basically result from the preferences and from the evaluating behaviour of humans under different conditions. In the third chapter "The Theory of value", Menger provides a more precise explanation of the standards and the processes according to which individuals evaluate objects (actions) as goods (services). This theory provides the basis for explaining exchange and relative prices. Chap, 4, "The Theory of Exchange" explains exchange and Chap. 5"the Theory of Price" proceeds by explaining prices as an unintended result of the interplay of individual intended actions. Chapters 6 and 7 are degressions and clarifications; but Chap. 8 provides another example of explaining institutions along the lines of methodological individuals, i.e. money. But apart from organizing the Grandsarze along methodological principles which are incompatible with methodological inductivist essentialism, Menger also indicates that this position is based on a misunderstanding with respect to the application of inductive methods in the social sciences. Obviously having methodological inductivist essentialism in mind be writes that past attempts to camy over the peculiarities of the natural scientific method of investigation uncritically into economics have led to most senoun methodological error, and to idle play with external analogies between the phenomena of ecnnomics and those of natum. (Menger 1981, p 47) and he proceeds explaining that authors defending such positions although calling “…themselves disciples of Bacon….. completely misunderstand the spirit of his method" Menger 1981, p. 47).Due to his primary aim of developing a satisfactory price theory. Menger refrains from providing a more elaborate critique of this version of essentialism in the Grundsatze. However, in the Untersuchungen, he launches a devastating attack on Gnundsatze, However, methodological inductivist essentialism. There he shows that this position rests on rather naive views with respect to inductive methods and that they have to be rejected on logical and epistemological grounds. His first objection refers to the so called argument of the transcendence of first order. According to him, methodological inductivist essentialism attempts to avoid abstraction from a given empirical basis.
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