uses the term, but because he begins to think out the importance
of equal respect, and, indeed, deems it indispensable
for freedom. Rousseau, as is well known, tends to oppose a
condition of freedom-in-equality to one characterized by hierarchy
and other-dependence. In this state, one is dependent
on others not just because they wield political power, or
because one needs them for survival or success in one’s cherished
projects, but above all because one craves their esteem.
The other-dependent person is a slave to “opinion.”
This idea is one of the keys to the connection that Rousseau
assumes between other-dependence and hierarchy.
Logically, these two things would seem separable. Why
can’t there be other-dependence in conditions of equality? It
seems that for Rousseau this cannot be, because he associates
other-dependence with the need for others’ good opinion,
which in turn is understood in the framework of the traditional
conception of honor, that is, as intrinsically bound
up with “préférences.” The esteem we seek in this condition
is intrinsically differential. It is a positional good.
uses the term, but because he begins to think out the importance
of equal respect, and, indeed, deems it indispensable
for freedom. Rousseau, as is well known, tends to oppose a
condition of freedom-in-equality to one characterized by hierarchy
and other-dependence. In this state, one is dependent
on others not just because they wield political power, or
because one needs them for survival or success in one’s cherished
projects, but above all because one craves their esteem.
The other-dependent person is a slave to “opinion.”
This idea is one of the keys to the connection that Rousseau
assumes between other-dependence and hierarchy.
Logically, these two things would seem separable. Why
can’t there be other-dependence in conditions of equality? It
seems that for Rousseau this cannot be, because he associates
other-dependence with the need for others’ good opinion,
which in turn is understood in the framework of the traditional
conception of honor, that is, as intrinsically bound
up with “préférences.” The esteem we seek in this condition
is intrinsically differential. It is a positional good.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
uses the term, but because he begins to think out the importance
of equal respect, and, indeed, deems it indispensable
for freedom. Rousseau, as is well known, tends to oppose a
condition of freedom-in-equality to one characterized by hierarchy
and other-dependence. In this state, one is dependent
on others not just because they wield political power, or
because one needs them for survival or success in one’s cherished
projects, but above all because one craves their esteem.
The other-dependent person is a slave to “opinion.”
This idea is one of the keys to the connection that Rousseau
assumes between other-dependence and hierarchy.
Logically, these two things would seem separable. Why
can’t there be other-dependence in conditions of equality? It
seems that for Rousseau this cannot be, because he associates
other-dependence with the need for others’ good opinion,
which in turn is understood in the framework of the traditional
conception of honor, that is, as intrinsically bound
up with “préférences.” The esteem we seek in this condition
is intrinsically differential. It is a positional good.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..