Racialization and racism
It is in the context of difficulties of this type that the concept of
racialization has become more common in social scientific
research. This acknowledges that propositions, insults, and more
elaborate doctrines are liable to vary in the degree to which they
contain the elements of what I have referred to as ‘strong’ or ‘hard’
racism. Exploring the degree to which propositions rest on
biological or physiological divisions between populations, and the
extent to which notions of innate superiority and inferiority are
overtly or covertly included, for example, allow a judgement to be
made of the degree of racialization and racism.
The concept of racialization moves research and political argument
away from the unproductive debates about whether any particular
individuals, propositions, claims, and doctrines are simply ‘racist’ or
‘non-racist’. Instead, the field is opened up to more useful analyses
of the different mixes of biological and cultural connotations of
difference, superiority and inferiority that emerge in public and
private statements, conversations, jokes, and so forth.
The popularity of the concept of ‘racialization’ in recent social
scientific research thus rests on the acknowledgement that the
simple label racism/racist obscures the fact that there is in fact a
whole spectrum of views from strict biological determinism – of the
type that ‘blacks are less intelligent and this is because of their
genetic inheritance’ – to very confused and loose mixes of cultural
stereotypes which may not contain any specific biological markers
at all: ‘Indian electrical wiring is a joke’ or ‘Of course he’s miserly, he
is Jewish/Scottish’.
Racialization also does not imply that those subjected to it are
necessary regarded as inferior. Thus it also encompasses the not
uncommon notions of the innate cleverness of Jews or Japanese.
And the application of covert quotas in the past against the
admission of these groups for fear of their domination of places at
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prestigious American universities was no less racist for being based
on the supposed superiority of populations of Jewish and Japanese
origin.
Religious racism? The case of Islamophobia
In the wake of the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on
11 September 2001 and the rise of militant or radical Islamism in
various parts of the world in the last part of the 20th and the early
part of the 21st century, it has increasingly been argued that a new
fear, ‘Islamophobia’, has gripped the Western world and is reflected
in general suspicion, physical attacks against mosques and Muslim
individuals, and discriminatory behaviour by state agencies
especially the police against Muslim communities. Statistical
evidence certainly bears out that overt discrimination of all types
against Muslims living in Europe and the USA has shown an often
dramatic increase.
Islamophobia is said to draw upon historical associations relating to
the long-standing hostility and military conflicts that occurred in
medieval and early modern Europe, culminating in the Crusades
and the dramatic defeat of Islamic power in Spain in 1492. The use
by the American President George Bush of the idea of a ‘crusade’
against Islamic radicals, amongst a host of other statements and
publications against Islam – for example, a whole spate of books
in Italy and France criticizing the illiberality, backwardness, and
misogyny of ‘fundamentalist’ Islam and comparing it unfavourably
with Christianity – have lent support to the notion of a new
Islamophobia in the West.
This hostility to Islam has often been described as a form of racism.
How credible is the equation between Islamophobia and racism?
Two problems with the idea of Islamophobia should be noted in
passing. Firstly, the idea of ‘phobia’ is unhelpful, because of its
implications of mental illness and pathology, an issue that is
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discussed later. Secondly, as the political scientist Fred Halliday has
quite rightly pointed out, the term is too broad and encompasses
such a large range of views and practices that it impedes nuanced
understanding of the phenomenon.
Whether Islamophobia can be regarded as a form of racism,
though, is worth pursuing briefly. Given that Muslims globally have
all shades of skin colour, ethnicity, and nationality, it is difficult to
argue in any straightforward way that even if Islamophobia exists, it
is a form of racism. The use of the notion of racialization, rather
than plunging the discussion straight into a stark choice between
racism/non-racism, can be helpful.
Consider one popular argument against Turkey’s membership of
the European Union, that because Turkey, although not a
theocratic state, has a majority Muslim population it can never be
properly integrated with European culture. Arguably the issue is
racialized by the predominant European view of Turks as also
non-white, but the degree to which this attitude to Islam is a
form of racism would require the arguments to be unpacked. For
example, to what extent is this lack of assimilability regarded as
relatively permanent, thus naturalizing and essentializing Islam
and Muslims? And are the religion and its followers regarded as
generally inferior or uncivilized? Such judgements are often
implicit, but in some contexts and publications are more
overtly made. Thus, the argument around Islam in the context
of Turkey is not necessarily racist. It may be more or less so, or
not at all.
In the UK, the extreme-right British National Party leaders have
been secretly filmed at their meetings where their speeches have
explicitly conflated ‘Muslims’ and ‘Asians’ as rapists of vulnerable
white teenagers. The degree of racism and the consciousness of
intention here is arguably much clearer than in most opinions
against Turkey’s membership of the European Union. A legal
prosecution of two leaders of the BNP on the grounds of ‘inciting
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racial hatred’ has so far been unsuccessful. The question of Islam is
also central to the case as the BNP leader Nick Griffin is distinctly
heard denouncing the religion as wicked and evil, as allowing the
rape of infidel women, and therefore is regarded by him as a crucial
element in the Asians’ racist behaviour against white women. The
intertwining of racism and the sexuality of immigrants and
foreigners that is evident here is of course a long-standing theme in
racist beliefs.
Islamophobia and racism: the case of Kilroy-Silk
Islamophobia’s possible racism was also an issue in the Kilroy-Silk
affair mentioned in the first chapter. While this example may seem
too limited by its context, it allows an exploration of issues relevant
to other instances which are likely to recur.
What is striking about the British broadcaster’s comments in his
newspaper column is the way in which there is an indiscriminate
conflation between religion and race, Islam and Arabs. His
article in the Sunday Express of 4 January 2004 was entitled
‘We Owe Arabs Nothing’. It castigated ‘Arabs’, Muslims, and
Islam for making no contribution to real civilization. ‘They’ had
only given ‘us’ oil, ‘suicide bombers, limb amputators and women
oppressors’.
‘Arab’ regimes are labelled barbarous, and in a by-line in bold,
Kilroy-Silk concludes that it is obvious that ‘not all cultures are
morally equal’. This is just a sample of the remarks in the article.
In response to critics of Kilroy-Silk, his morning television show
was taken off the air by the BBC, and the country became embroiled
in yet another debate about the meaning of racism and the ‘political
correctness’ to which he had supposedly fallen victim.
But how racist were his remarks in the light of the discussion
provided in this book?
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In recklessly generalizing about all ‘Arabs’ – and he even includes
Iran, not an ‘Arab’ nation, in his remarks – and denouncing them
for lack of civilization, Kilroy-Silk has certainly strayed into racist
territory. ‘Arab’ is a geo-linguistic, proto-racial category. By
labelling all Arabs uncivilized, as he does in effect, Kilroy-Silk is
repeating a classic racist move, treating ‘them’ all – Arab nations
and individuals – as inferior to ‘us’ (‘we’, by strong implication, are
all whites, Christians, Europeans, and Westerners).
It is not unreasonable to relate his remarks to some sort of
‘Islamophobia’ despite the problematic nature of this term, and to
use his comments to illustrate how in everyday usage religious
groups are racialized to create a field of debate in which ‘race’,
culture, religion, and political regimes get confusingly conflated.
‘Islamophobia’ or any other kind of hostility to Islam and Muslims
is not necessarily racist, but in many contexts can take a relatively
‘strong’ or ‘hard’ racist form as it appears to do in the case of
Kilroy-Silk.
If the remarks are broadly within the terrain of racism does that
mean that it is fair to call Kilroy-Silk a racist? This may appear to be
the same issue but, despite overlaps, should be regarded as an
analytically distinct question, to do with racist identity, as we shall
see.
Before considering the question of racist identities, however, it is
necessary to discuss another difficult issue raised by the Kilroy-Silk
affair: the question of intention in judging the racism of an action,
including the making of potentially racist comments.
Words, intentions, and actions
In July 2004 the British Crown Prosecution Service decided not to
charge Kilroy-Silk with the offence of ‘incitement to racial hatred’
or any other under the Race Relations legislation. The CPS
concluded that Kilroy-Silk’s remarks against Arabs and Muslims
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were not ‘intentionally insulting’. Indeed, Kilroy-Silk had
apologized for the remarks, claiming in the next day’s Daily
Express that he had never